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Abstract
Globalization can be defined as the extent and intensity with which a country’s production, trade 
and capital flows are integrated in the world economy. Our focus is on the globalization through 
international trade flows. After analyzing the main theoretical predictions about the effects of 
global trade integration on trade patterns between countries of different levels of income and 
technology, this paper investigates the case of Brazil, focusing on its trade integration over 
the last 26 years (1990-2016). Particularly, we are interested in investigating whether or not 
(and if so, to what extent) Brazil’s recent trajectory has been directed to a regressive pattern 
of specialization. By regressive specialization we refer to that in which both production and 
export structures are strongly oriented to goods of low technological sophistication and low 
income-elasticity of demand. The recent theoretical literature on technological gaps and 
long-term growth suggests that, when a country enters into a quick and sustained regressive 
pattern of specialization, its capacity of showing growth rates aligned with its balance-of- 
-payment equilibrium is reduced and, therefore, a falling behind trajectory is observed. Our 
main empirical findings are: (i) the technological gap significantly widened for all groups of 
manufactured goods classified by factor content and technological sophistication; (ii) the income 
elasticity of demand for Brazilian exports is greater than for Brazilian imports, suggesting a 
regressive specialization concentrated in low-tech goods and implying that growth has been 
constrained by long-term balance-of-payments equilibrium (Thirlwall’s Law); and (iii) a 
very marked trend of high concentration of Brazilian exports in primary goods, but a more 
diversified basket of imports composed of high technologically sophisticated manufactured 
goods, reinforcing the regressive specialization of Brazil’s trade pattern in the last decades.
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1. Introduction
Globalization can be defined as the extent and intensity with which a country 
is integrated in the world economy. Although such integration can and does 
reach production, trade and capital flows, our focus is on the globalization 
through international trade flows. Even though other earlier waves of economic 
internationalization have happened—from the Industrial Revolution until the 
beginning of World War I —, the speed and intensity with which the present wave 
of trade globalization has spread over the entire world economy since the early 
1980s has no precedent in modern occidental economic history. In fact, from 
the 1980s onwards, the rise and diffusion of the microelectronic revolution as well 
as the significant reduction of trade barriers also put pressure on most developing 
countries to accelerate trade integration into the world economy.
In the case of Brazil, for instance, between 1990 and 1994, after several decades 
of protectionist policies adopted under the import substitution development 
strategy, the Brazilian government decided to adopt a unilateral and ambitious trade 
liberalization programme, which eliminated most nontrade barriers and reduced 
average nominal tariffs for all goods from 30.5% to 11.2%.1 Since several studies 
were released in the 1990s and 2000s with the goal of evaluating the impacts of the 
Brazilian trade liberalization experience on productivity, trade pattern, employment 
etc.,2 this paper does not aim at replicating such studies. However, there is 
extensive literature documenting that two marked phenomena have characterized 
the Brazilian economy in the last 25 years: the first one is the significant and 
continuous reduction of the share of value-added industrial activities in the GDP;3 
and the second one is a recurrent long-term trend of overvaluation of the Brazilian 
currency in relation to the currencies of Brazil’s main trading partners.4 Although 
the second phenomenon may have contributed to deepening the first one, both 
may have influenced the observed changes in the pattern of trade integration of the 
Brazilian economy in terms of sectoral specialization, geographical composition 
of trade flows and the competitiveness of Brazilian goods.
This paper has two main goals: first, it reviews and analyzes the main 
theoretical predictions about the effects of global trade integration on trade patterns 
between countries of different income and technological levels; and second, it 
investigates the case of Brazilian trade integration over the last 26 years (1990-
2016). Particularly, we are interested in investigating whether or not (and if so, 
1 See Kume, Piani and Souza (2000, p. 11).
2 See Feijó and Carvalho (1994), Moreira and Correa (1998), Bonelli and Fonseca (1998) and 
Nassif (2003).
3 See Nassif (2008), Oreiro and Feijó (2010) and Nassif, Feijó and Araújo (2015), among others.
4 See Bresser-Pereira (2010), Nassif, Feijó and Araújo (2017) and Nassif, Bresser-Pereira and Feijó 
(2017).
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to what extent) Brazil’s recent trajectory has been directed to a regressive pattern 
of specialization. By regressive specialization we refer to that in which both 
production and export structures are strongly oriented to activities or segments 
of low technological sophistication and low income elasticity of demand.5 As we 
will further discuss, the recent theoretical literature on technological gaps and 
long-term growth suggests that, when a country enters into a quick and sustained 
regressive pattern of specialization, its capacity of showing growth rates aligned 
with their balance-of-payment equilibrium is reduced and, therefore, it enters a 
“falling behind” trajectory, the term coined by Abramovitz (1986) to contrast with 
a “catching up” path.
For analyzing Brazil’s recent change in trade patterns, we will estimate the 
following indicators: 
i) income elasticity of demand for exports and imports; 
ii) the composition and dynamics of both exports and imports classified by 
factor content and degree of technological sophistication; 
iii) the degree of export diversification and the importance of the extensive and 
intensive margins of trade for Brazilian exports, whose indicators permit 
us to measure the extent to which Brazil’s export expansion resulted from 
the increase of “old” goods that it traditionally exports (intensive margin) 
or from the raise of either “old” or “new” products highly demanded by 
global markets (extensive margin); 
iv) the degree of concentration versus diversification of the export basket; 
v) the index of intraindustrial trade; and 
vi) the geographical distribution of exports and imports. Most indicators will 
be calculated through descriptive statistics, using a methodology compiled 
by Reis and Farole (2012). 
This paper is divided into four sections, including the Introduction. Section 2 
presents a theoretical analysis of the determination of trade patterns in a globalized 
economy, emphasizing recent theories of international trade and focusing on trade 
flows between countries with different per capita income and technological levels. 
Section 3 presents a general view of the Brazilian economy during the period under 
study and shows empirical evidence of Brazil’s recent experience, based on the 
abovementioned indicators. Section 4 draws the main conclusions of the study as 
well as suggesting some policy implications.
5 Coutinho (1997) first coined the term “regressive specialization” when analyzing the Brazilian 
economy throughout the 1990s. In our paper, rather than production, we will emphasize the trade 
(export and import) structures.
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2. Trade patterns in a globalized world: a survey of the 
theoretical literature
2.1 Trade patterns in traditional trade models 
of comparative advantage
The investigation of the determinants of trade patterns and the advantages of 
a country to engage in global trade has been a long tradition in economics. In 
the classical political economy, technological capacity was the main source for 
explaining different sectoral productivity levels between countries and, therefore, 
the existence of global trade. Adam Smith (1776/1937), however, was more 
concerned about the effects of global trade on a country’s economic growth, 
while David Ricardo (1817/1951) and John Stuart Mill (1848/1970) deviated 
completely from the theoretical analysis to the effects of international trade on 
the allocative efficiency of productive resources and its capacity to increase social 
well-being by augmenting the trade volume between countries engaged in free 
trade. Indeed, in Smith’s theoretical analysis, trade was driven by differences in 
sectoral absolute costs between countries (which, in turn, reflect differences of 
absolute technology and productivity), whereas in Ricardo’s and Mill’s analysis, 
trade was driven by differences in sectoral relative costs (which, in turn, reflect 
differences of comparative productivity). Since in Ricardo’s and Mill’s theoretical 
framework technology was exogenously determined and evaluated in comparative 
terms, they started a long-lasting tradition in which trade patterns were basically 
determined by supply-side forces.
In the modern neoclassical theoretical treatment of Ricardian analysis, the 
determination of trade pattern by comparative advantage depends on several 
unrealistic assumptions, such as perfect competition in goods and labor markets, 
total domestic labor mobility, technologies subject to constant returns to scale and 
full employment. Under such conditions, by extending the analysis to many goods 
(a continuum of goods), Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson’s (1977) seminal paper 
showed that comparative advantage and trade pattern are jointly determined by 
different relative productivities at the sectoral level and different relative wages 
between countries. In fact, since differences in sectoral relative productivities are 
determined first and ranked for each country, and given a country’s relative wage 
compared with another trade partner, it is possible to determine the range of goods 
in which each one of them has comparative advantage. As the expenditure shares 
are the same in both trade partners (homothetic demand), the demand side has no 
role in determining trade pattern. In such circumstances, international trade leads 
to complete interindustrial specialization, even considering that a subset of goods 
cannot eventually be traded, be it because relative unit labor costs (that is, the ratio 
of wage rates to labor productivity) are the same in both countries, or because 
transport costs can be high enough to work as a trade constraint.
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Although the Ricardian hypothesis for determining a country’s trade pattern 
(different sectoral relative productivities reflecting distinct relative technologies) 
has been supported by several empirical tests,6 it was the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
version of comparative advantage that became the standard neoclassical trade model 
for explaining trade pattern, gains from trade and advantages of free trade policies. 
In fact, in an original paper written when Sweden was still a net export of 
agricultural goods, Eli Heckscher (1919/1991) argued that, in a world characterized 
by different relative factor endowments, each country tends to specialize in the 
production of goods intensively using the abundant factor, importing goods that 
intensively use the scarce factor. A doctoral thesis supervised by Heckscher, Bertil 
Ohlin (1924/1991) transformed those original views into an elegant mathematical 
framework that not only permitted the determination of a unique solution for the 
trade pattern, but also the establishment of a theoretical basis for developing a set 
of important theorems about global trade by neoclassical economists. 
The original model proposed by Ohlin (1924/1991) is based on the following 
set of assumptions: 
i) the technology of each industry i, subject to constant returns to scale, is the 
same for all countries in the world; 
ii) there is no possibility of factor-reversal (that is, the technology cannot be 
reversed by changes in factor prices); 
iii) each country (“region”, in Ohlin’s word) is defined by its relative factor 
endowment; 
iv) each factor of production has perfect domestic mobility; 
v) relative abundance or scarcity of each factor of production defines its relative 
price in autarky; and 
vi) given production functions and preferences, each country has its relative 
goods and factor prices, output and resources allocation determined by the 
Walrasian general equilibrium mechanisms. 
The main proposition of the H-O model is that each country exports goods 
that intensively use the abundant factor in their production, and imports those that 
intensively use the scarce factor. 
In his book Interregional and international trade, Ohlin (1933/1968) showed 
that, if the world economy was characterized by industries that operate under perfect 
competition and factor immobility, free trade—by changing relative factor prices 
in each country—would be the main channel explaining geographical location of 
6 See McDougall (1951) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
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productive activities and pattern of specialization. It is worth noting that, in the H-O 
model, the unrealistic assumption of identical and unchanged sectoral technologies 
between countries is kept even when relative factor prices are changed by free 
global trade. In a word, trade is the main channel through which each country can 
surpass the scarcity of some factors of production.
The original presentation of the H-O model in a Walrasian general equilibrium 
framework eased the development of important theorems related to free trade. 
The first one, shown by Samuelson (1948; 1949), is the factor price equalization 
theorem, which predicts that, under a set of restricted conditions, such as perfect 
competition in goods and factors markets (in a model of two sectors and two 
factors), homothetic demand and trade completely determined by the H-O 
proposition, free trade integration tends to generate a total equalization of goods 
and factor relative prices since both goods will be produced by both countries. 
The intuition of this theorem is simple: since a country can use more than one 
factor (say, capital and labor, and not only one factor, as in the Ricardian model), 
trade in goods generates a full equalization of factor relative prices through full 
equalization of goods relative prices.7 As Feenstra (2004, p. 13) points out, the 
factor equalization theorem suggests that “trade in goods is a perfect substitute 
for trade in factors”. In the face of large inequality in wages between countries in 
the global economy, the theorem has a very unrealistic conclusion. However, it 
demonstrates that free global trade at least generates changes in relative goods and 
factor prices compared with those observed in autarkic conditions.
The second theorem, demonstrated by Stolper and Samuelson (1941), shows 
that, if comparative advantage is the main force to govern trade patterns in the 
global economy, free trade can predict net gains for society as a whole in each 
country, but its impacts on income distribution is unequal among the factors’ 
owners. The intuition of this theorem is also quite simple: it says that, if two goods 
are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competitive conditions 
in a country, the engagement in free trade relations tends to increase the relative 
price of the exported good and, therefore, to also increase the relative price of the 
factor intensively used in its production; but it tends to decrease the relative price 
of the imported good as well as the relative price of the factor intensively used in 
its production. In a word, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that free trade 
redistributes the national income to the owners of the abundant factor in such a 
way that the main losers are the owners of the scarce factor.
It is curious that most studies based on the H-O model do not worry about the 
eventual effects of technological change on a country’s trade pattern. If technical 
progress occurs, it is always an exogenous phenomenon. The same cannot be 
7 For an original mathematical demonstration, see Samuelson (1949), and for a rigorous recent 
demonstration, see Feenstra (2004, p. 13-15).
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said about changes in a country’s endowment. In this case, as the third theorem 
derived from the H-O model stresses (the Rybczynski theorem), a change in factor 
endowment of a country will change the relative output of the economy. Rybczynski 
(1955) supposes two factors (say, natural resources and labor) and two industries 
(one natural resource-based, and the other, labor-intensive) subject to constant 
returns to scale and perfectly competitive. If new large sources of natural resources 
are discovered in a country, there will be a disproportional rise in the output of the 
natural resource-based sector and a contraction of the labor-intensive. This result 
depends on the relative factor prices remaining unchanged, a requirement that is 
easily satisfied because the relative demand of the factors is going in opposite 
directions (while demand of natural resources is increased, the demand of labor 
is contracted proportionally).
It is important to remember that the normative implications of the H-O model 
and the factor price equalization theorem were severely criticized by Latin American 
economists in the early 1950s. The most severe attack came from Raúl Prebisch, 
the second executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac). In an influential paper, Prebisch (1950) 
criticized the main hypothesis that supports the factor price equalization theorem: 
first, while the theorem predicts that the engagement of primary products exporting 
countries in global free trade would favor relative prices and industrialization by 
importing capital goods with falling relative prices, Prebisch (1950) argued that 
such a result depends on the income elasticity of demand of both goods being 
equal to one, a hypothesis not held in practice;8 and second, as empirical evidence 
shows that manufactured goods (the main imported good of Latin-American 
countries) have much higher income elasticity of demand in the long run, 
periphery countries specialized in primary and commodity goods have their long-
term economic growth recurrently constrained by balance of payments crisis.9,10
Indeed, the soundness of the H-O model as a general theoretical approach 
to explain trade patterns and gains from trade has long lived up to theoretical 
and empirical proofs. The theoretical model was originally developed for two 
sectors, two factors and two countries (2x2x2 model). However, if we consider 
an extended H-O model including many goods, many factors and many countries, 
8 In Prebisch’s (1950, p. 1, italics ours) words, “it is true that the reasoning on the economic 
advantages of the international division of labor is theoretically sound, but it is usually forgotten 
that it is based upon an assumption which has been conclusively proved false by facts. According 
to this assumption, the benefits of technical progress tend to be distributed alike over the whole 
community, either by the lowering of prices or the corresponding raising of incomes”.
9 As Thirlwall (2011, p. 13) recognized, Prebisch’s (1950) equation expressing his centre-periphery 
model was “the true forerunner of my [that is, Thirlwall’s] balance of payments constrained growth 
model developed much later”.
10 Needless to say, Prebisch’s (1950) criticism was related to the long-term trend (or secular trend) 
of the income elasticity of demand of manufactured goods vis-à-vis primary and commodity 
goods. In other words, rather than static gains from trade, Prebisch was worried about the dynamic 
effects on economic development for countries unconditionally engaged in free global trade and 
specialized in primary goods.
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the determination of the trade pattern becomes quite complicated. Several 
studies have shown that the trade pattern, the factor price equalization and the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem are only rigorously determined if the number of 
goods, factors and countries is equal. In the more realistic case in which the 
number of goods is higher than the number of factors (maintaining two trade 
countries), the trade pattern is indeterminate (FEENSTRA, 2004, p. 65).
At the empirical level, the most controversial result was the famous Leontief’s 
(1953) test which, by calculating the capital/labor ratio for US exports and imports 
for 1947, showed that the share of US exports was mostly labor-intensive. Since the 
US was then considered a capital abundant country, the Leontief paradox revealed 
the theoretical inability of the H-O model to explain the country’s trade pattern. 
Since Leontief’s (1953) test was published, the H-O model has been subjected to 
a continuing debate between Neoclassical and Structuralist economists. Within the 
Neoclassical framework, the first discussions concentrated on possible explanations 
for the Leontief test to not validate the H-O predictions, such as having ignored 
other factors of production (e.g., land) rather than capital and labor as well as not 
having considered skilled and unskilled labor. At the empirical level, since the 
original H-O model did not take into consideration all these hypotheses, this kind 
of criticism is misleading (FEENSTRA, 2004, p. 37). 
Since then, empirical tests on the main predictions of the H-0 model have 
used the procedure suggested by Vanek (1968), according to which, instead 
of the capital-labor ratio of exports and imports, as in Leontief’s test, the test 
should estimate the factor content of exports as well as the factor content of 
imports. Through input-output matrices, he suggests computing the factor 
service content in each exported and imported good. For instance, an estimate 
of Brazil’s net exports (calculated as the difference between the domestic 
output and domestic consumption) results in the difference between the factor 
content of its exports and the factor content of its imports. If the difference is 
positive, it means that Brazil exports (on net) the services of this input; if the 
difference is negative, it means that Brazil imports (on net) the services of this 
input. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (H-O-V) model is appealing for permitting 
friendlier empirical tests on trade pattern based on the factor proportion model. 
However, the Vanek (1968) model requires several restricted assumptions, such 
as identical  constant-returns-to-scale technologies for all countries in the world 
and total factor price equalization. Despite this, the modern acceptance of factor 
proportion theory is considered within the H-O-V framework.11
As to Structuralist criticisms on the H-O model, the Leontief paradox gave rise 
to several academic studies in the 1960s aiming at investigating new hypotheses 
11 See, for instance, Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.1) and Feenstra (2004, p. 37-56) for 
mathematical demonstrations. See Helpman (2011, p. 38-45) for textual presentation.
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for explaining trade patterns in the manufacturing sector as well as the dynamic 
effects of global free trade on long-term growth. This will be discussed in the 
following subsections.
2.2 From the heterodox models of the 1960s to the “new 
trade theories” of the late 1970s and onwards
2.2.1 Linder’s demand-push trade model and the “new 
trade theories” of the late 1970s and onwards
The so-called “new trade theory”, a modern theoretical current of international 
trade captained by Paul Krugman, Elhanam Helpman, Anthony Venables, James 
Brander, Barbara Spencer and others, justifies the adjective “new” because most 
models incorporate imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale and the 
dichotomy of homogeneous versus differentiated goods as basic assumptions. 
However, such assumptions had been considered by heterodox authors in the 
1960s, like Staffan Linder (1961), Michael Posner (1961) and Raymond Vernon 
(1966). Indeed, differently from the former group of authors, this latter group, as 
they did not construct formal trade models, treated forces such as oligopolistic or 
monopolistic competition, product differentiation and economies of scale more 
as possibilities than precise hypotheses. Even so, the major innovation of some 
of these models pioneered a demand basis trade theory for explaining a country’s 
international competitiveness for exporting manufactured goods. In this subsection, 
we will only present the Linder (1961) model.
Linder (1961) accepts the theoretical hypothesis of factor endowment for 
explaining international trade of natural resource-based goods (especially 
agricultural goods). However, he rejected the H-O model in the explanation 
of international trade in manufactured goods. His model is one of the first 
to emphasize the central role of domestic market size in providing demand 
high enough for creating potential international competitiveness for a country 
to export manufactured goods. Like under free trade, the initial costs are 
high enough for firms of the manufacturing sector to export. As a matter of 
fact, Linder (1961) stresses that a “representative demand” must exist in the 
domestic market before the global markets can be reached. In other words, as 
most industrial firms of the manufacturing sector must choose technologies 
subject to increasing returns to scale, they will not be able to have international 
competitiveness for exporting such goods if the size of the domestic market is 
not large enough to provide them minimum efficient scales. For Linder, then by 
taking advantage of their proximity to their respective domestic markets, firms 
seek to explore economies of scale to reach foreign markets in the future. In 
Linder’s (1961) theoretical model, the higher a country’s per capita income, the 
higher will be the size of its domestic demand and the more sophisticated will 
be the demand pattern. Thus, its potential for exporting manufactured goods 
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will be higher. His main conclusion is that countries with the highest and closest 
levels of per capita income have a significant share of their manufacturing trade 
characterized by intraindustrial trade of differentiated goods. The importance of 
Linder’s theoretical model is that he was the first to explain the predominance of 
manufactured goods in the trade among countries of similar per capita income. 
His main contribution is that he was the first to not only indicate economies of 
scale and product differentiation as the main sources of intraindustrial global 
trade, but also to suggest that such sources are primarily realized in the domestic 
marketplace, before firms are able to compete in the global markets.12
Yet, from the late 1970s on, a set of neoclassical models labelled by Krugman 
(1990a) as “new trade theory” began to appear. Rather than for having incorporated 
imperfect competition, the adjective “new” can be justified by three main reasons: 
i) First, because these models demonstrated that, in certain oligopolistic cases, 
as trade pattern depends on a combination of complex factors existing 
in each country, such as market size, number of competing firms, factor 
prices, barriers to entry etc., its theoretical determination is much harder 
to predict; in some cases, the trade pattern is either undetermined (see 
HELPMAN; KRUGMAN, 1985, p. 86-88) or presents multiple equilibria 
(see HELPMAN; KRUGMAN, 1985, p. 53-55); 
ii) Second, because these authors mathematically demonstrated the original 
Graham’s (1923) conjecture according to which, in the presence of 
economies of scale and market power, trade globalization can, under certain 
conditions, lead to an unequal distribution of gains among countries. If, 
for example, trade reallocates productive resources from sectors subject to 
increasing returns to scale to sectors subject to constant returns to scale in 
a country, all gains from trade may be appropriated by the countries whose 
reallocation of resources happened in the opposite way (see HELPMAN; 
KRUGMAN, 1985, p. 50-55);
iii) And third, because, by using Vanek’s (1968) suggestion of estimating the 
trade pattern based on the factor content services presented in both exports 
and imports, these models also seek to show how the basic H-O-V model 
can interact with new models incorporating economies of scale, product 
differentiation and monopolistic competition.
In this section, as we are interested in cases in which the trade pattern can be 
determined and the gains from trade are assured for all countries, the new trade 
12 It is unacceptable that Linder’s (1961) contribution, despite being recognized by Krugman’s 
(1979) seminal paper, has been omitted from the bibliographic references in Krugman, Obstfeld 
and Melitz (2012), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Feenstra (2004), the three leading textbooks 
in undergraduate and graduate courses.
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theory shows that such cases are only guaranteed if imperfect competition assumes 
the monopolistic competition form.13 In the basic model presented by Krugman 
(1979, 1980), an industry from two countries is composed of several firms 
producing a large number of differentiated goods and competing in monopolistic 
competition. Despite all firms using only one factor of production (labor), as 
technology is identical for all firms, but subject to economies of scale, and all 
differentiated products enter symmetrically into demand, each firm produces only 
one differentiated and close substitute good. As competition is driven by product 
differentiation, each firm chooses its price and maximizes profits by equalizing 
marginal revenue to marginal cost, but ignoring the prices fixed by their competitors 
in the market. 
To demonstrate that the economies of scale are the main cause for trading, 
Krugman (1980) also supposes that both countries have the same factor endowments 
and technological level. Considering zero transport costs, if these countries decide 
to engage in free trade, rather than being driven by any difference between relative 
costs or factor endowments (as in traditional models of comparative advantage), 
trade pattern will be determined by economies of scale and product differentiation, 
in such a way that each differentiated good is produced by only one firm and in only 
one country.14 Differently from comparative advantage, in which trade pattern is 
of the interindustrial type, trade pattern driven by economies of scale and product 
differentiation is of the intraindustrial type. As Krugman (1980, p. 952) concludes, 
“gains from trade will occur because the world economy will produce a greater 
variety of goods than would either country alone, offering each individual a wider 
range of choice”. Even though the direction of trade is undetermined, since all 
range of goods are differentiated, it does not matter who produces what, but rather 
that trade integration provides a greater volume of varied goods. In an extended 
model, Krugman (1980) also considers the case in which one of the two countries 
has a larger domestic market than the other. The result is as intuitively expected: 
since a larger domestic market has a major potential for exploring economies 
of scale, the bigger country will be a net exporter of all range of goods whose 
technology is subject to increasing returns to scale, as had already been suggested 
by Linder (1961).
13 We leave the cases in which the presence of increasing returns to scale makes a country reduce 
its social well-being and long-term growth after engaging in free trade for the next section.
14 The introduction of transport costs does not modify the general results. See Krugman (1980, 
section II, p. 953-955).
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Figure 1. Global trade between developed and developing countries
Developed countries
Developing countries






Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Krugman (1990b, p. 77).
In another paper, Krugman (1981) integrated the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade model with the main features of the new trade theory, whose results are 
illustrated in Figure 1. With this paper, Krugman completed the trilogy that might 
have justified his Nobel Prize laureate in 2008.15 Krugman (1981) proposed a model 
in which the global economy is composed of several countries defined by either 
their similarity or differences in their factor endowments.16 In practical terms, if 
we divide this world into two groups of countries, the first would be formed by 
all capital-abundant developed countries, while the second would be composed 
of all natural-resources-abundant developing countries. The global output is 
composed of two sectors: a capital-intensive, which produces scale-intensive and 
differentiated-and-knowledge-based manufactured goods subject to increasing 
returns to scale and monopolistic competition; and a natural resource-based, 
which produces primary and natural-resource-based manufactured goods subject 
to constant returns to scale and perfect competition. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, given the different factor endowments of the two groups 
of countries, a free integration of their markets implies that the resulting net trade 
pattern will be mainly driven by the traditional H-O model and predominantly 
of interindustry type. In other words, while the developed countries will be net 
15 The trilogy is composed of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 Krugman papers (the 1990’s paper summarizes 
the 1981’s). According to the Nobel Prize Committee, Krugman was honoured with the prize 
in economics in 2008 “for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity”. See 
<https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2008/press.html>. 
16 This is a free adaptation of Krugman’s (1981) seminal model, which was summarized by Krugman 
(1990b). In this model, instead of capital and labor factors of production, the author uses only 
labor, differentiated by labor type 1 and labor type 2. Two countries will have identical factor 
endowments, if, by indexing their respective labor force as L1 = 2 – z and L2 = z; and L1*= z and 
L2*= 2 – z (asterisks refer to the second country), the result for z is equal to 1. 
20 | André Nassif and Marta dos Reis Castilho
exporters of technologically sophisticated manufactured goods, which intensively 
use the services of the abundant factor (capital) available in this group, the 
developing countries will be net exporters of primary goods and industrial 
commodities, which intensively use the abundant factor (natural resources) 
available in this group. However, there may be a range of intraindustrial trade 
in scale-intensive and differentiated-and-knowledge-based manufactured goods 
between both groups, but the more different their respective factor endowments, 
the smaller the volume of such flows, which are, as already shown, driven by 
economies of scale and product differentiation. Summing up, Krugman’s (1981) 
model demonstrates why most of the global flows of technologically sophisticated 
manufactured goods are concentrated in rich countries whose factor endowments 
are similar to each other.
2.2.2 The “new new trade theories” of intrafirm global trade and 
theoretical models explaining the genesis of global value chains
More recently, a new generation of neoclassical trade models (the “new new 
trade theory”) has predicted intrafirm global trade in which a significant share 
of manufactured goods is produced and traded by heterogeneous firms ranked 
among the highest level of productivity (HELPMAN, 2011, ch. 5; MELITZ; 
TREFLER, 2012). Melitz (2003) developed the seminal intrafirm trade model. 
By departing from similar assumptions on intraindustrial trade with monopolistic 
competition, Melitz (2003) assumes that a firm’s entry into a segment of 
differentiated manufactured goods depends on its expectation of profits to cover, 
at least, the research and development (R&D) costs of its differentiated good as 
well as the costs of manufacturing it. In Melitz’s model, there is free entry and 
exit of firms in an industry for developing and manufacturing each specific good, 
but profitability is highly uncertain because it depends on the unknown firm’s 
total factor productivity (TFP). In a strategy to decide whether or not to develop 
and manufacture a new good, a firm estimates different levels of productivity, 
which are decomposed into expected productivities if all goods are for selling in 
the domestic market, in foreign markets or both. The decision to distribute part 
of the total production to foreign markets involves additional costs because the 
firm must face variable trade costs, such as transport costs, tariffs imposed by 
importing countries and other trade costs. 
Despite not emphasizing it, Melitz (2003) implicitly assumes Linder’s 
hypothesis that larger domestic markets tend to generate higher levels of 
productivity than smaller ones. Thus, in his model, firm size matters for 
determining their corresponding level of productivity, in such a way that 
the largest firms, by being more able to draw gains from static economies 
of scale, have higher levels of productivity and major potential to export. In 
these circumstances, by integrating into the global markets, these firms tend 
Trade patterns in a globalized world: the case of Brazil  | 21
to maximize their gains from productivity resulting from higher economies of 
scale and the expanded market. The impact of global trade integration is similar 
to that of Krugman’s model: it puts each surviving firm’s demand up, making it 
more elastic due to the joint effect of more competition and bigger market size. 
Although the markup of the largest surviving firms is reduced, they can increase 
their operating profits due to the effect of higher market shares.17 However, as 
Melitz and Trefler (2012, p. 101) point out, 
economic integration through market expansion does not directly affect firm 
 productivity. Nevertheless, it generates an overall increase in aggregate productivity 
as market shares are reallocated from the low-productivity firms with high marginal 
costs to the high-productivity ones with low marginal costs. 
In other words, the increase in aggregate productivity results in a reallocation 
of resources within the industry. 
As exports are not the only way of reaching global markets and since the 
majority of world trade in goods and services are driven by multinational firms, 
trade economists have also been modelling the possibility of firms to establish 
affiliates abroad. The three main cases are the vertical multinational FDI (foreign 
direct investment), which occurs when a multinational firm chooses to keep its 
headquarters in one country and production in another with the goal of taking 
advantages of factor price differences across countries in the world economy 
(HELPMAN, 1984); the horizontal multinational FDI, which occurs when a 
multinational firm decides to operate plants with specific fixed costs in multiple 
countries, which are chosen considering the different transport costs between 
them (MARKUSEN, 1984; 2002); and complex integration, which occurs when 
multinational FDI combines both vertical and horizontal strategies in the world 
economy in such a way that, as summarized by Helpman (2011, p. 146-147), 
subsidiaries of multinational companies sell their products in host countries and 
import intermediate inputs from parent firms. But they also export products to their 
parent countries as well as to third markets, to affiliated parties and nonaffiliated 
parties alike.
Since complex integration has been not only the most registered form of 
multinational FDI, but also the mechanism through which the global value chains are 
interconnected, it is worth analyzing its main determinants. Helpman (2011, p. 148) 
suggests “thinking about horizontal FDI, vertical FDI, and platform FDI as interrelated 
17 By comparing a situation that occurred pre-and-post a trade liberalization reform, this only 
happens for firms that choose to produce and sell for both domestic and foreign markets after 
trade liberalization reform. For firms that choose only to produce and sell in domestic markets, 
the operating profits are reduced due to the fall in prices resulting from foreign competition. For 
details, see Melitz and Trefler (2012, p.103-109).
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strategies”.18,19 A theoretical model is summarized as follows.20 The world economy 
is represented by a set of big countries from the North (the United States, France 
and Germany) and small countries from the South (the Philippines, Vietnam and 
Indonesia). There are several intermediate inputs for production of a final differentiated 
good, and their location in each of the countries depends on different fixed costs of 
FDI in intermediate goods as well as the productivity levels of heterogeneous firms.
Figure 2. FDI strategies and the genesis of global 
value chains in the world economy












Source: Helpman (2012, p. 151).
Figure 2 illustrates four different strategies of FDI that generate and spread 
global value chains in the world economy. In the absence of transport costs and 
for a given fixed cost in assembling final goods, the first strategy occurs when 
higher fixed costs of FDI in intermediate goods production imply that neither 
FDI in assembly nor in production of intermediate goods in the South countries 
can be utilized by very low-productivity firms from the North. This is because 
they are unable to cover the fixed costs. The second strategy occurs when firms 
from the North have high productivity levels that can offset high fixed costs of 
FDI. In this case, they can invest in both intermediates and assembly goods in the 
South countries. In the third strategy, the above-average-productivity firms from 
18 For “platform FDI”, Helpman (2011) refers to “the acquisition of subsidiaries whose purpose is to 
export their products to third countries (that is, not to the country in which the parent firm is located)”.
19 This suggestion is based on 2003 data on different strategies of US companies across the global 
economy. Helpman (2011, p.148) documents that “while American companies operating in Greece 
were primarily driven by horizontal FDI considerations, since they exported back to the United 
States only 1 percent and to third countries only 8 percent of their total sales, in Ireland and 
Belgium investment was driven primarily by platform FDI. And in Malaysia and the Philippines, 
both vertical FDI and platform FDI played in important role”.
20 This theoretical model is a slightly modified model summarized by Helpman (2011, ch.6).
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the North can engage only in assembling final goods in the South countries. They 
are unable to produce intermediate goods due to their extremely high fixed costs. 
In the fourth strategy, low-productivity firms can engage in FDI in intermediate 
goods in the South if, and only if, the fixed costs of their inputs are low enough 
to offset their low productivity levels. Although these models were designed to 
understand different strategies of multinational FDI pursued by the largest firms 
from North developed countries, they also clearly suggest that most firms from 
South developing countries—being characterized by smaller sizes—are hardly 
able to engage in FDI and create multinational enterprises.21
2.3 A Structuralist-Neoschumpeterian technological gap 
model: trade patterns and growth dynamics
As all the conventional models previously analyzed assume that either factor 
endowment or technology is exogenous, both trade patterns and the gains or losses 
from trade are evaluated in static terms. Although few theoretical trade models 
are worried about the dynamic impacts of free trade on countries’ long-term 
growth, Grossman and Helpman (1991), on the Neoclassical front, and Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990), on the Structuralist-Neoshumpeterian approach, show 
consistent predictions about the countries’ engagement in the global economy. 
In practical terms, the great challenge for developing countries characterized by 
large technological and productivity gaps in relation to developed countries is to 
evaluate the extent to which unconditional adoption of free trade policies could 
significantly reduce their long-term growth. This issue is clearly analyzed by both 
Neoclassical (GROSSMAN; HELPMAN, 1991) and Neoschumpeterian (DOSI; 
PAVITT; SOETE, 1990) approaches. Despite their quite different methodological 
frameworks, they reach similar conclusions.22 The most important cases are as 
follows. The first one is to consider the global economy composed of two countries 
that produce manufactured (the capital-intensive sector, subject to increasing returns 
to scale and product differentiation) and traditional goods (the labor-intensive sector 
that operates under conditions of constant returns to scale) and are completely 
similar in terms of endowments or technologies and accumulated knowledge. If 
these two countries decide to integrate their markets through free trade practices, 
both could sustain the same long-term growth rates only and only if the same rate 
of innovation is observed in both countries. Free trade benefits both countries by 
enlarging the variety of traded goods, but the net dynamic effect of global trade to 
long-term growth would be zero. 
21 The obvious exception is (or tends to be) Chinese firms that operate in several industries, especially 
in manufacturing and service sectors.
22 Among other aspects, while the Neoclassical Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) model assumes 
several unrealistic hypotheses such as free entry in the research and development (R&D) sector 
(notwithstanding that it is subject to large increasing returns to scale) as well as treating technology 
as a service easily absorbed by firms through the knowledge transmission channels, Dosi, Pavitt 
and Soete’s model (1990) gives up on the method of general equilibrium, refuses the idea that 
technology can be freely traded in domestic and global markets and accepts the assumption 
that the pattern of specialization can have long-term cumulative (positive or negative) effects.
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The second case is to consider the global economy formed by two groups 
of countries that produce the above-mentioned kinds of goods: the first group 
is composed of the developed innovator countries characterized by high 
per capita income, high levels of aggregated productivity and technological 
capabilities close or equal to the technological frontier; the second group gathers 
all developing imitator countries characterized by per capita incomes close 
to the average of the world economy as well as significant technological and 
productivity gaps in relation to developed countries. Since these assumptions are 
closer to the reality of periphery countries like Brazil, we will briefly present a 
Structuralist-Neoschumpeterian model proposed by Cimoli and Porcile (2010),23 
who replicate more realistically long-term growth dynamics and implications of 
their engagement in free international trade.24
Cimoli and Porcile (2010) depart from Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson’s 
(1977) Ricardian model of comparative advantage of a continuum of goods. We 
will adapt this model to a world composed of two groups of countries: the North 
innovator countries (N), specialized in the production of manufactured goods and 
services of high technological sophistication; and the periphery-South imitator 
countries (S), specialized in the production of primary and low-tech goods. 
Assuming that labor is the only factor of production, the static pattern of comparative 
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where an is the labor requirement for producing a unit of good n and the symbol “*” 
refers to North innovator countries. Relative labor requirements are a function of the 
technological gap. In other words, relative productivity of South countries is greater 
in the first an goods (because they require lower labor inputs), in our case, in primary 
and low-tech goods. Since the model is a continuum of goods, we can also rank them 
in a [0,1] interval according to a decreasing order of comparative advantage of South 
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is a function in which good z is associated with each point in the [0,1] interval, 
with A(z) continuous and decreasing in z; that is, the comparative advantage of 
23 The basic model was firstly presented by Cimoli, Dosi and Soete (1986), Cimoli (1988) and Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990). In this paper, we will strictly follow Cimoli and Porcile’s (2010) model.
24 Even considering their quite different methodological approach, Grossman and Helpman’s model 
(1991, ch. 9, p. 246-250) has similar results to the Cimoli and Porcile one presented afterwards. Yet, 
it is interesting that in his book entitled Understanding the global trade, written without formalism 
with the goal of reaching a large audience, Helpman (2011) put aside the dynamic implications of 
an unconditional engagement in free trade for developing countries, especially lower long-term 
growth rates when their technological gap is large in relation to developed countries. 
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periphery-South imitator countries to North innovator countries in industry z has 
a decreasing ranking, or A’(z) < 0. 
With many goods, comparative advantage in each country depends not only 
on relative labor productivity, but also on relative wages between the two groups 
of countries w/w*. Thus, the good z will be produced in the South countries if:
a(z)w ≤ a* (z) w* (3)














ω ≤ A(z) (6)25
Given ω, South countries will produce (and so will have comparative 
advantage)26 in the following interval of goods:
0 ≤ z ≤ z̃ (ω) (7)
Taking (6) as an equality, we can define the border for good z as:
z̃ = A-1 (ω) (8)
As A-1 is an inverse function of A(ω), the pattern of specialization of North 
innovator countries will be concentrated in the interval:
25 Since Cimoli and Porcile (2010) assumed that wages are measured in nominal terms in both 
countries (according to their respective currencies), they had to consider the nominal exchange 
rate to put both wages in a common currency unit. However, for simplicity, we follow the original 
Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson’s (1977) assumption according to which wages are measured 
in real terms (as units of required labor) in both countries.
26 As is well known, the Ricardian model of comparative advantage predicts complete specialization 
in such a way that all goods in which a country has comparative disadvantage will be produced 
by its trade partner. For details, see Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz (2012, ch.3).
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z̃ (ω) ≤ z ≤ 1 (9)
Figure 3 shows the structure of production and pattern of specialization as a 
decreasing function of ω, the relative wage between South and North countries. 
A(z) is a decreasing curve because South countries lose comparative advantage as 
the economy moves towards goods of higher technological sophistication. Yet,  ω 
is an increasing curve in z because, as the South countries tend to diversify their 
economies, the rise in demand for labor implies an increasing of ω. Figure 3 suggests 
that an increase in wages in South countries relative to those in North countries 
will shift the ω to the left, reducing the set of goods produced and exported by the 
former group of countries.27 Under conditions of perfect competition, comparative 
advantage depends simultaneously on relative productivities and relative wages 
between the two groups of countries. In such circumstances, South imitator countries 
will have comparative advantages in all goods for which A(z) > ω. In the world 
trade equilibrium, their production and export structures cover all goods from 0 
to z̃, while those of the North innovator countries cover the goods from z̃ to 1.28







Source: Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977, p. 825).
From this point on, differently from Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson’s (1977) 
static model, which assumes labor market-clear conditions as well as homothetic 
27 In a comment on this result, Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990, p. 202) remind us that “it also applies in 
those cases where there are capital inputs and positive profits, provided that there is no ‘reswitching 
of commodities’”.
28 Note that at the borderline z̃, as comparative advantage is the same for all groups, there is no 
international trade for this good.
Trade patterns in a globalized world: the case of Brazil  | 27
preferences of the demand functions, we will consider Cimoli and Porcile’s (2010) 
dynamic model through which both trade pattern and the effects on long-term 
growth are simultaneously determined. The following assumptions are implicitly 
introduced in the model:
i) Based on Engels’s microeconomic laws, the n goods can show a wide range 
of price and income elasticities.
ii) Although there is only one factor of production (labor), the economic system 
is formed by workers and capitalists, who make the initial financial funds 
required for contracting workers.
iii) All goods are produced under conditions of imperfect competition, in such 
a way that the entrepreneurs fix prices according to a mark-up m on average 
labor costs. Thus, the set of goods z will be produced in South imitator 
countries if mwaz < m*w* a*z.
iv) Since perfect competition is also removed from labor markets, the nominal 
wage is the result of bargaining between labor unions and entrepreneurs.
v) Rather than labor constrained, capitalist economies are balance-of-payments 
constrained in the long run.
vi) Given the state of technology, capitalist economies are generally below 
full employment; in the short run, economic activity depends on effective 
demand in the spirit of Keynes (1936).
vii) In the long run, changes in technology are endogenously determined and 
affected by expected demand.29
By allying with the Structuralist view pioneeringly exposed by Raúl Prebisch 
(1950), Nicholas Kaldor (1966) and A. P. Thirwall (1979), Cimoli and Porcile 
(2010) present a model in which not only the pattern of specialization, but also 
the pace of long-term growth are affected by the technological gap (TG), defined 







= ≥ 1  (9a)
29 Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990, p. 203), for instance, discard the possibility that technical progress 
can result from properties related to the steady-state equilibrium with “representative agents” 
and expectations according to “rational expectations”.
30 Most empirical studies used to take the relative average labor productivity between South and 
North countries as a proxy measure of the technological gap. In such cases, the technological 
gap TG varies in the interval 0 ≤ G ≤ 1, as we will consider in the empirical section ahead.
31 The remainder of this section rigorously follows Cimoli and Porcile (2010).
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The dynamics of the technological gap is expressed by the following differential 



























The differential equation (10) suggests that the pace of the technological gap 
between South and North countries is influenced by the actual technological 
gap level itself (TG) and the degree of diversification of the economy, captured 
by the z produced goods. The parameter a is the autonomous component of the 
pace of the technological gap and is expected to be positive. While the parameter 
b captures the ability of South countries to imitate innovation (both in process 
and products) introduced by North countries, the parameter c represents the 
opportunities and challenges posed by the actual technological gap at any time. 
While the expected sign of parameter b is positive (the more diversified the economy 
in producing z goods, the more rapid the South will catch up with North countries), 
the expected sign of parameter c is twofold: in line with Gerschenkron’s (1962) 
hypothesis, a positive c means that there are larger opportunities and challenges 
for South countries to reduce the technological backwardness in relation to North 
countries over time; however, contrary to Gerschenkron’s hypothesis, a negative 
c, by meaning a sharp deterioration of relative technological levels, could imply 
the deepening of technological backwardness of South countries over time and 
make it harder to catch up.
The pattern of specialization of the economy is also affected by the technological 
gap according the following equation (CIMOLI; PORCILE, 2010, p. 223):
a z
a z
A z TG z
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( ) = ( ) = − −γ α β  (11)
where γ, α and β are positive parameters. This implies that, if South countries are 
successful in reducing their relative technological gap, the curve A(z) in Figure 3 
would be shifted to the right, meaning more diversification of South imitator 
countries towards a growing number of produced z goods.
To determine the growth dynamics in both groups, Cimoli and Porcile’s (2010) 
model assumes no capital flows, in such a way that the current account in North and 
South countries must be in equilibrium. Since prices are formed by a  mark-up rule 
(pz=mwaz=mwLz/yz; where p is the price of good z, m the mark-up, w the wage, az 
the labor requirement for producing a unit of good z, L the total labor force, and Y 
the nominal income related to each good z), total nominal income of South countries 
can be expressed as (and, symmetrically, total nominal income in North countries 
is related to the production of goods 1 – z̃):





The current account equilibrium can be derived from the import demand 
functions in each group of countries (that is, the demand of North countries 
corresponds to South exports and vice-versa). If each good z has the same share 
in total nominal demand in North and South countries, the share of imports 
in total demand of the North and South will be, respectively, (w*m*L*)z ̃  and 
(wmL) (1 – z ̃).33 Then, by combining these expressions, the conditions for current 
account equilibrium can be expressed as:
 (13) 
The relative South-North aggregate income YS/YN can be expressed as a function 
of the pattern of specialization:
 (14)
If m = m* and by rearranging (14), we can express the relative wage w/w* as 
a function of relative production structures and employment levels:
( )
 (15)
By differentiating equation (14) with relation to time, we can obtain the 
long-term relative economic growth of the South countries:
 (16) 
By multiplying and dividing the previous result by z̃, we obtain:
 (17)
Expressing  = z̃/(1 – z̃) and dividing both sides of (17) by , we find the 
long-term relative economic growth rate of South countries:
32 The nominal income in production of each good z is defined as pzyz=mwLz. In the aggregation, 
Cimoli and Porcile (2010: 228) assume that m and w are the same in all economies.
33 Remember that, while the South produces all goods from 0 to z ̃, the North produces all those 
from z̃ to 1 (or 1 – z̃).
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 (18)
Equation (18) shows that the technological gap is reduced in South imitator 
countries if and only if this group is successful in diversifying its productive 
structure. This occurs when z̃ > 0 and South countries can grow at greater rates 
than North countries.
The more interesting part of Cimoli and Porcile’s (2010) technological gap 
model is when they consider a more realistic case in which goods z have different 
income elasticities of demand. The demand function expressed in equation (13) 
is replaced by another in which the share of goods in total expenditure rises 
exponentially with the number of goods z. Equation (13), the condition for current 
account equilibrium in North and South (and remembering that South countries 
produce goods from 0 to z̃), is replaced by:
(mwL)1 - z̃ = (m*w*L*)z̃ (19)
Expressing (19) in logarithms and differentiating both sides with respect to 
time (assuming m and m* are constants), we obtain the dynamic condition for the 
current account equilibrium:
) ) ( )
 (20)
As in equilibrium z = 0 and, therefore, z = z̃, we finally obtain the long-term 
dynamic growth rate of South countries relative to North ones:
 (21) 
With such different specifications for demand functions in both countries, the 
result shown in equation (21) suggests two important conclusions: (i) the relative 
growth rate of South countries depends on their ability to diversify their economies, 
in such a way they will only be able to catch up with North countries if z̃ > 1/2.; 
and (ii) since z̃ can also be interpreted as the income elasticity of demand for South 
exports (εX), and (1 – z̃ ) as the income elasticity of demand for South imports (πM), 
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Equation (22) shows the so-called balance-of-payments constrained growth 
rate condition required by Thirlwall’s Law: the capacity of South countries to 
show growth rates aligned with their balance-of-payment equilibrium over time 
depends on the elasticity of demand for their exports being greater than elasticity 
of demand for their imports (THIRLWALL, 1979/2011). If so, the South entered 
a catching up trajectory; if not, it entered a falling behind path. As Cimoli and 
Porcile (2010, p. 232) conclude:  
The key role of demand growth is highlighted by this result. In effect, depending on 
how the demand function is defined, we have very different implications for economic 
growth with the same technological gap and pattern of specialization. The pattern of 
specialization is endogenous, supply-side (i.e. technology and productive structure) 
driven, but the demand functions define how a specific pattern translates into economic 
growth. At the end of the day, both the Schumpeterian and Keynesian sides of the 
growth equation must be taken into account in the model. 
3. Empirical evidence: the case of Brazil
In this section, we will analyze the evolution of the trade patterns of the Brazilian 
economy between 1990 and 2016. Throughout this period, Brazil experienced a 
process of trade liberalization (1990-1994), the stabilization of high- inflation rates 
(Plano Real, 1994) and other liberalizing economic reforms, such as privatization 
of state enterprises, the liberalization of the domestic financial system and the 
openness of the capital account, among others. This section is divided into two 
subsections: in the first, we will briefly analyze the main reforms introduced in 
Brazil in this period, with emphasis on trade liberalization; in the second, we will 
show empirical evidence on the changes that occurred in the Brazilian trade patterns.
3.1 A brief analysis on Brazil’s economic reforms and 
some previous indicators (1990-2017)  
From the last quarter of the 19th century to 1930, the Brazilian economy was 
highly open to international trade and, despite the presence of a few infant 
 low-tech industries, unable to show a vigorous industrialization process. In this 
period, Brazilian productive and export structures were strongly concentrated 
on coffee and other primary products of low income and price-elasticity of 
demand. By depending on the export performance of these goods in the global 
markets,  long-term economic growth in Brazil was driven by world markets 
and constrained by price volatility of its main exports. At the same time, in the 
absence of a vigorous manufacturing sector, a significant share of manufactured 
goods was imported (FURTADO, 1982).
The dramatic crisis of the Brazilian primary export sector resulting from the 
Great Depression of the 1930s put an end to the previous development model and 
32 | André Nassif and Marta dos Reis Castilho
was responsible for the spontaneous process of industrialization based on import 
substitution (IS) (FURTADO, 1959/1982). From the 1930s on, Brazil’s long-term 
growth has been driven by the dynamism of the domestic market. However, the 
process of industrialization only gained momentum after 1950, especially under 
Getúlio Vargas’s second-term (1950-1954) and Juscelino Kubistschek’s (1956-
1960) governments, which adopted several protectionist measures in favor of 
infant heavy industries (TAVARES, 1963). 
From the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1980s, industrial and trade policies 
maintained their essential elements. In each step of the IS process, governments 
targeted some industries as industrial policy priorities and combined high tariffs, 
import licenses and export subsidies (these latter especially after the 1970s) to 
protect the Brazilian manufacturing sector and boost exports of manufactured 
goods. In practice, the import license regime was only eliminated with trade 
liberalization in March 1990.34 Even considering the two attempts at trade 
liberalization in 1966 and 1988, the economy maintained a very high protectionist 
structure—at least when compared to that adopted by the Asian Tigers at the height 
of their protectionist policies (AMSDEN, 2001)—due to the prevalence of nontariff 
barriers (NTB) (NASSIF, 1995).
Another peculiarity of the industrial policy in Brazil is that the country has 
always been open to foreign direct investment (FDI) driven by multinational 
enterprises (MNE). Policies for attracting MNEs in Brazil focused on the 
implementation of import substitution and, hence, aimed at reducing both 
technology and import dependencies (balance of payments issues). This contrasts 
with some Asian countries that were traditionally open to FDI, such as Singapore 
and China. These countries applied measures that ensured the transfer of technology 
or technological spillovers to local firms. Therefore, Brazil was not able to draw 
upon the best techniques available in important industries of high and even medium 
technologies, such as capital goods, and chemical and automotive industries 
(DAHLMAN; FRISCHTAK, 1993).35 
Although the protectionist policies have been marked by several drawbacks, 
such as the absence of selectivity, excessive national content requirements and the 
survival of rent-seeking activities throughout the period 1957-1980, there was a 
fine coordination between industrial and trade policies, in such a way that the latter 
was conditioned by the main goals of the several adopted National Development 
34 An import license as a sine qua non condition for an import to be approved lasted from 1947 to 
1970, when the former was replaced by the “guia de importação” (an import document issued 
by the Foreign Trade Department, Cacex). Although the creation of this document has been 
justified for fulfilling statistical purposes, in practical terms it continued to work as an instrument 
of administrative import control. See Nassif (1995). 
35 As Amsden (2001, p.14) commented, “China, India, South Korea and Taiwan began to invest 
heavily in their own proprietary national skills. In contrast, Argentina and Mexico, and to a lesser 
extent, Brazil and Turkey increased their dependence for future growth on foreign know-how”.
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Plans. Despite all the imperfections of the protectionist policies of the IS period, 
there is no doubt that they created the conditions for developing a diversified 
manufacturing sector in Brazil over time.36 
It is important to stress that, differently from some Asian countries (e.g. China 
and Taiwan), which sought to finance a significant share of gross investment 
with domestic savings, Brazil’s development strategies—as well as most Latin 
American countries—were highly dependent on foreign savings, especially 
through long-term foreign lending, which, borrowed under conditions of flexible 
international interest rates, was the main modality observed from the 1970s on. 
The shock of international interest rates in the 1979-1982 period led Brazil and 
several other Latin American countries to a deep crisis (the external debt crisis) 
that lasted until the beginning of the following decade.
In fact, the eruption of the external debt crisis in 1980, which led to the collapse 
in international private capital flows to Latin-American countries in 1982, meant 
a complete disconnection between industrial and trade policies. These policies 
subsequently lost their most efficient tools for promoting catching up in Brazil. 
In fact, since a large amount of annual expenditures on external debt (principal 
plus interest expenditures) had to be paid, trade policies, especially import policy, 
became a powerful instrument for saving foreign exchanges—rather than being 
an industrial policy tool. The most infamous instrument for import control was 
the so-called Annex C, released by Brazil’s Foreign Trade Department (Cacex), 
through which thousands of goods were prohibited in Brazil between 1980 and 
March 1990. In 1984, manufactured goods included in Annex C represented 
46.8% of total tariff lines. In 1989, several goods of textile & clothing, footwear, 
plastic and motor vehicle industries still had import prohibition (CARVALHO 
JR., 1992). In practice, the long duration of such import control virtually meant 
infinite protection for the respective domestic industries. Despite a program of 
tariff reduction having been adopted in 1988, the prevalence of several nontariff 
barriers implied that the effective protection in Brazil was practically unchanged 
(KUME; PIANI; SOUZA, 2000).
The decision to introduce a unilateral trade liberalization reform in Brazil 
between March 1990 and 1994 must be understood within this economic context. 
In such circumstances, the programme was planned with the goal of redesigning 
the structure of protection through the elimination of most NTBs, including the 
Annex C, as well as the reestablishment of the import tariff as the main instrument 
of protection for the economy. Comparatively to other experiences of trade 
liberalization in developing countries during the 1980s and the 1990s, the Brazilian 
trade reform represented a deep microeconomic shock for three reasons: first, it was 
36 For a comparison between interventionist policies and the process of industrialization in Brazil 
and South Korea, see Moreira (1995) and Amsden (2001, ch. 9).
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concluded in a relatively rapid period of time (five years), differently from South 
Korea and India, whose trade liberalization reforms lasted around six (from 1983 to 
1988) and more than ten years (from 1991 on), respectively;37 second, contrary to 
the recommendations of trade liberalization literature, the elimination of NTBs and 
reduction of import tariffs were jointly introduced, and trade reform was adopted 
together with the liberalization of capital account as well as within a context of 
sharp overvaluation of the Brazilian currency;38,39 and third, again, differently from 
South Korea and India, which preserved industrial policy together with their trade 
liberalization programs as a strategy for pursuing catching up, industrial policy 
practically disappeared from the government’s policy focus in Brazil between 1990 
and early 2000s, even after the conclusion of trade reform.40 
Despite the negative microeconomic shocks, several studies show sound 
empirical evidence that between 1990 and 1998 labor productivity registered 
significant annual average growth rates in Brazil, reversing the low and stagnant 
annual average growth rates shown in the previous decade. Additionally, 
notwithstanding the use of different methodologies for measuring productivity, 
the labor productivity growth observed in the first half of the 1990s in Brazil 
was undeniable. In a panel data econometric model based on industrial plants, 
Nassif (2005), for instance, estimated that labor productivity in the manufacturing 
sector grew at 1.4% between 1988 and 1994, and 5% between 1994 and 1998. 
These results confirm similar empirical evidence of previous studies, which 
had also attributed such performance to the positive impacts of the Brazilian 
trade liberalization.41 Nassif (2003) and Kupfer (2005) showed, however, that 
such efficiency growth was mainly due to a labor shortage and the renewal 
of machines & equipment through the import of capital goods, rather than to 
technical change diffusion.
Table 1 gives an updated tariff structure for Brazil compared with other selected 
countries.
37 Between 1989 and 1994, while the average nominal import tariff for all goods in Brazil was 
reduced from 39.6% to 11.2%, the standard deviation dropped from 14.6% to 5.9% in the same 
period. See Kume, Piani and Souza (2000, p. 11).
38 For Brazil and South Korea, see Moreira (1995). For Brazil and India, see Nassif (2003; 2007).
39 For a theoretical discussion on how the speed and sequence of trade liberalization reforms should 
be designed, based on stylized facts of real experiences in Latin America and Asia, see Bhagwati 
(1978) and Michaely, Papageorgiu and Choski (1991). For the sequence of all economic liberalizing 
reforms (trade, domestic financial system, capital account etc.), see McKinnon (1991).
40 In the case of South Korea, the clear change in priorities did not mean discarding industrial policy 
to promote structural change. According to the OECD (2012), “since the 1980s, the government 
carried out research and development (R&D) and gave incentives to the private sector for 
investing in R&D. By the 1990s, the chaebols (Korean conglomerates), were highly committed 
to R&D and the government widened the policy mix for R&D to include support to venture 
business in line with the rising demand from the private sector”. The OECD (2012, p. 24) also 
documents that, by 2011, the Korean government maintained industrial promotion programmes 
for “leading industries”, “strategic industries” and “infrastructure and business support”. Yet 
India’s governments never renounced industrial policy, which continued to be included in the 
5-Year Plans after trade liberalization in 1991 (NASSIF, 2007).
41 See Hay (1997), Bonelli and Fonseca (1998), Rossi Jr. and Ferreira (1999), and Bonelli (2002). 
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Simple average tariff rate 11.6 8.3 13.0 9.5 8.3 14.1
WTO agricultural products 10.2 14.6 36.4 14.8 9.9 60.0
WTO non-agricultural products 11.8 6.5 9.5 8.6 8.0 6.6
Bound tariff lines  
(% of all tariff lines)
100 100 74.9 100 n.a. 90.1
Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines) 0.4 0.4 n.a. 0.6 n.a. 1.9
Non-ad valorem tariffs  
(% of all tariff lines)
0.0 14.8 6.1 0.5 3.8 0.8
International tariff peaks  
(% of all tariff lines)
27.0 6.4 13.6 14.8 21.4 10.7
Minimum tariff for all applied 
tariff rates1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Median tariff for all applied 
tariff rates1
14.0 5.0 10.0 8.0 n.a. 8.0
Maximum tariff for all applied 
tariff rates1
41.3 80.0 150.0 65.0 55.0 800.3
Overall standard deviation of all 
applied tariff rates
8.41 10.3 16.5 7.5 14.1 44.11
Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, Several Issues.
Notes: * Refers to Southern African Custom Union; 1 Data for 2014, calculated by Castilho and 
Miranda (2017); n.a.: not available.
Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 1. First, by comparing with some 
developing and developed countries, it is a myth to assert that Brazil is very close 
to being or is a protectionist country. The simple average tariff rate applied to 
all products (11.6%) in 2017 was lower than that of South Korea (14.1%) and 
India (13.0%).42 The degree of dispersion of all applied tariff rates, measured by 
the standard deviation, is one of the lowest among the Brics countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and much lower than South Korea, 
whose indicator was 44.1% in 2016. This suggests that the other applied tariff 
lines are not far from the simple average tariff line. These results do not match 
with Bonelli’s (2015, p. 487, translated from Portuguese) assertion, according to 
which “Brazil is an economy with very few links to the international economy.” 
In a similar line, Bacha (2016, p. 3, translated from Portuguese) comments that 
“Brazil is one of the most closed economies in the world.” It is true that, by 2016, 
the share of trade flows (exports plus imports) in Brazil’s GDP (18.3%) was very 
low compared with middle income countries (38.6%) or countries like India 
(27.5%), whose economy is, however, more protected than Brazil, as Table 1 
shows. However, Brazil’s low degree of trade openness can be explained by the 
lack of competitiveness of manufacturing exports as well as the very low annual 
42 The simple average tariff rate on Brazilian imports in 2017 kept the same level registered at the 
end of the trade liberalization program in 1994. However, during this period, there were several 
modifications in the intersectoral and intrasectoral structure of protection in Brazil. See Kume, 
Piani and Souza (2000) and Abreu (2004).
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GDP growth rates (which imply low import volumes) observed in the last decades 
(only 2.4% between 1999 and 2016).43 
Second, although the use of the international peaks covers a significant part of 
all tariff lines,44 such peaks are in line with the Most Favourable Nation (MFN) 
tariffs negotiated multilaterally at the WTO. In any event, Brazilian effective 
tariff rates estimated by Castilho and Miranda (2017) for 2014 (an average rate of 
16.7% and a standard deviation of 15.2% for the overall economy) suggest that 
the structure of protection in Brazil should be reconsidered taking into account 
some distortions introduced by the high tariffs of some industries (e.g. transport 
equipment and some intermediate goods) as well as by modifications induced by 
protectionist lobbies or due to macroeconomic reasons.
From 2003 on, especially during Lula da Silva’s (2003-2010) and Dilma 
Rousseff’s governments (2011-2014), industrial policy returned as one of the 
leading mechanisms for promoting activities considered strategic for accelerating 
structural change towards scale-engineering-and-knowledge-based industries 
as well as diversifying productive and export structures, such as capital goods, 
software, information and communication technologies, pharmaceutical products, 
biotechnology, automobiles and others. In this period, three programmes of 
industrial policy were announced: Foreign Trade, Technological and Industrial 
Policy (Pitce, in Portuguese), in 2004; the Production Development Policy 
(PDP), in 2008; and Brazil Major Plan (PBM, in Portuguese), in 2011.45 All these 
plans had as their core goal to boost physical investment and innovation in the 
Brazilian economy. 
These plans, however, repeated old mistakes and well-known misleading 
policies that had prevailed during the time of the import substitution period: 
lack of selectivity and performance requirements from entrepreneurs who 
benefited from public incentives; an excessive use of public subsidies as the 
main instrument of governmental support, especially credit subsidies from 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES); and, last but not least, lack of 
coordination between industrial, trade and macroeconomic policies. One example 
43 The problem of the lack of competitiveness of exports will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Indicators on share of trade flows in GDP were drawn from the World Bank, World Economic 
Indicators, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS>. Accessed on 13 
October 2017. Indicators on Brazil’s annual GDP growth rates were drawn from the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Quarterly National Accounts at 1995 constant prices, 
<https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/pesquisa/cnt/tabelas>. Accessed on 13 October 2017. 
44 Moreover, for the WTO, tariff peaks correspond to rates exceeding 15%. Other possible definitions 
take into account the tariff level and structure of the country. For instance, Castilho and Carvalho 
(2017) consider tariff peaks as the rates that exceed the sum of the tariff average and the standard 
deviation.
45 For an analysis of Pitce and PDP industrial policies, see Coutinho et al. (2012). For details on 
Brazil Major Plan, see the website of Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce 
(MDIC), <http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/competitividade-industrial/politica-industrial/o-
que-e-pbm-2>. Accessed on 12 October 2017. 
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of coordination failure is related to the recurrent trend of overvaluation of the 
Brazilian real. Figure 4 plots the behavior of the real effective exchange rate 
(Reer) in Brazil since 1988.46












































































































Source: Brazilian Central Bank.
Figure 4 shows unequivocally that the overvaluation of the Brazilian real has 
been a recurrent trend since the early 1990s. The correction of such misalignments 
has only occurred after domestic or international shocks, such as the announcement 
of the stabilizing Plano Real in June 1994, the crisis of the electrical energy 
sector (apagão) in 2001, the electoral uncertainty during the transition from the 
presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in 2002-
2003, the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis and, finally, during the instability 
created by the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff throughout 2015. After 
all these episodes, the Brazilian real has entered a new appreciation trend in real 
terms. In an econometric model seeking to identify the main forces that pushed 
the Brazilian real towards that appreciation trend in the period 1999-2015, Nassif, 
Feijó and Araújo (2017) showed that the favorable terms of trade and the sharp 
differential between Brazilian and international interest rates were the most 
significant explanatory variables. 
Several studies have shown a strong correlation between the trend of 
overvaluation of the Brazilian real and the weak long-term economic performance 
46 In Brazil, the exchange rate is defined as the domestic price of a foreign currency. So, while an 
increase in the exchange rate means a depreciation of the Brazilian real, a decrease means an 
appreciation of it. The real effective exchange rate was calculated by the Central Bank as a 
weighted average of the Brazilian real against a basket of currencies of Brazil’s main trade 
partners, adjusted by the consumer inflation rate (IPCA).
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of the Brazilian economy, expressed by a sharp premature deindustrialization47 
as well as low rates of productivity and economic growth. After having been 
positively impacted by trade liberalization between 1988 and 1998, as previously 
discussed, the annual average growth rate of labor productivity in the Brazilian 
manufacturing sector has been stagnant and showed negative results between 1999 
and 2015 (-0.2% p.y.).48 With such a stagnant performance, it is not surprising 
to verify, according to Figure 5, that the technological gap of the manufacturing 
sector in Brazil (measured as the ratio of Brazil’s labor productivity to the US 
labor productivity), after having shown a slow catching up trajectory between 
1970 and 1980, has tendentially widened outwards, as can be seen by the trend 
line.49 Figure 5 also shows that the last period during which all segments of the 
Brazilian manufacturing sector significantly reduced the technological gap occurred 
in the aftermath of trade liberalization, especially between 1990 and 1998, as we 
discussed earlier. Particularly, the science-engineering-and-knowledge-based 
industries, after having reached almost half of the technological frontier in 1997, 
entered a falling behind trajectory afterwards. Although these indicators have not 
been updated by Eclac-Padi, such trends can hardly have registered significant 
changes in the opposite direction, in the face of the stagnant behaviour of the labor 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector in Brazil in the last decade, as 
we commented earlier. 
The falling behind trajectory of the Brazilian economy can also be confirmed 
by the results of Thirlwall’s Law for the Brazilian economy between 1980 and 
2010—see equation (22) in Section 2—, estimated by one of the authors in a 
previous paper (NASSIF; FEIJÓ; ARAÚJO, 2015), and summarized in Table 2.
47 Several studies have attributed the real appreciation trend of the Brazilian currency as being one of 
the main causes of Brazil’s premature deindustrialization. See, for instance, Bacha (2013), Bresser-
Pereira (2010), Nassif, Feijó and Araújo (2015) and Nassif, Bresser-Pereira and Feijó (2017).
48 These results were calculated and kindly offered to the authors by Jorge N.P. Britto, from the 
Department of Economics at the Fluminense Federal University. The labor productivity was 
calculated as the ratio of the value of industrial transformation (a proxy for value added) to the 
number of employees directly occupied at production (these indicators are estimated, in turn, 
by the Annual Industrial Survey – PIA, from IBGE). The numerator was deflated by sectoral 
Wholesale Price Indices (IPA) of Fundação Getulio Vargas.
49 These data are estimated by the Program for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (Padi) 
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Eclac). Originally, the taxonomy of Eclac is composed by natural resource-based, labor- 
-intensive and engineering-based manufacturing industries. As these latter industries also 
contain scale and science-based industries, we grouped all of them and renamed them as 
science-engineering-and-knowledge-based manufacturing industries.
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Figure 5. Technological gap of the manufacturing sector in the Brazilian 
industries classified by factor content and technological sophistication





















































Table 2. Thirlwall’s Law and the falling behind trajectory  
of the Brazilian economy (1980-2010)
Period Income-elasticity of demand 
for Brazilian exports (ex)
Income-elasticity of demand 





1980:3 – 2010:2 1.059 1.993 0.531
1980:3 – idem 1.358 1.967 0.690
1999:1 – 2010:2 1.329 3.361 0.395
Source: Nassif, Feijó and Araújo (2015, p. 1.326). 
Note: 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to quarters.
According to Table 2, while between 1980 and 1998, Brazil’s estimated annual 
average growth rate compatible with its balance of payments equilibrium was 69% 
lower than the world GDP growth rate, between 1999 and 2010, this rate reduced 
significantly to only 39.5%, confirming the falling behind path in the decade.50
50 In another paper (NASSIF; FEIJÓ; ARAÚJO, 2016), we estimated Thirlwall’s Law for all the Brics 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the period 1995-2013. The results did not alter 
for Brazil and revealed that only China and India showed a catching up trajectory in the period.
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3.2 Brazil’s trade patterns and the recent trajectory 
towards regressive specialization
For Brazilian international trade, the period comprised between 1990 and 2016 
was characterized by a strong dynamism. During these 26 years, the total trade 
value was multiplied by six while world trade was multiplied by four. Brazilian 
exports attained US$ 336 billion and imports, US$ 246 billion. 
The performance of Brazilian international trade was nevertheless very 
different during the 1990s and the 2000s. As shown in Figure 6, not only was the 
growth in trade flows stronger in the 2000s but also the dynamics of exports and 
imports were opposite in the two periods. During the 1990s, after the Brazilian 
trade liberalization and during the period marked by the overvaluation of Brazil’s 
currency, imports grew at a faster pace than exports. From the 2000s on, Brazilian 
exports grew faster than imports, even though imports also increased significantly. 
The Brazilian market share (total trade) evolved from 0.8% of world trade in 
1990 to 1.4% in 2016.51 During the 1990s, the Brazilian market share increase 
was pulled by the significant expansion of imports. The cumulated growth rate 
of Brazilian imports (148%) was twice the exports growth rate (75%) and well 
above the world trade growth rate (96%). From 2000 on, Brazilian exports grew 
faster than imports (236% and 147%, respectively) but both of them showed 
higher rates than global trade (119%). Therefore, Brazil reached its highest share 
51 In a longer-term perspective, Brazilian exports attained their highest world market share during 
the 1980s (trade statistics are available from 1962 on). The market share average was 1.3% for the 
whole decade (lower than the period 2010-2016) but it attained 1.7% in 1984. On the other hand, 
the lowest average was reached during the 1990s, when Brazilian market share was 1.0%. From 
then on, the share has increased both in the 2000s and during the last period (2010-2016).
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Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database. 
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in world trade in this 26-year period for exports in 2011 (1.5%) and for imports 
in 2013 (1.3%). The different pace of the recent decrease in world and Brazilian 
trade flows made the export market share recover to 1.4% (2016 data).
In Table 3, trade flows were broken down into industries according to the 
relative use of productive resources (resource-based versus labor-intensive) as well 
as the degree of technological sophistication, according to Pavitt’s (1984) classic 
taxonomy (for sectoral classification, see Appendix 1). The strong increase in 
Brazilian trade flows over this period was accompanied by important composition 
changes, mainly on the export side. On the import side, the sectoral composition 
kept relatively stable, with the manufactured goods representing a large majority 
of imports. The most important change during the whole period was the reduction 
in oil imports in the first half of the 1990s because of the increase in the national 
oil production. After that, changes in import structure were minor, despite the 
increase in imports of labor and scale-intensive sectors.52 
On the export side, as stated, there were important composition changes. The 
share of manufactured goods in exports remarkably decreased, going from 78% of 
total exports in 1990-1995 to 53% in 2011-2016, while the share of primary goods 
in total exports increased from 21% to 45% in the same period. In fact, between 
1990 and 2016, the share of primary goods more than doubled and recovered the 
importance they used to have in exports in the beginning of the 1970s. This process 
has been named “export primarization” and, as mentioned in Section 3.1, several 
factors explain it, such as the commodities price boom in the 2000s due to the 
so-called Chinese demand-pull effect, the persistent overvaluation of the national 
currency and the dynamism of domestic demand for manufactured goods.53 The 
primarization process observed in exports was not, however, observed—at least 
not with the same intensity—in domestic production. In fact, Torracca (2017) 
shows the mismatch between the structure of exports and of domestic production. 
While primarization is clear and strong in external trade flows, the domestic 
production structure is much more stable and less intensive in primary goods and 
resource-based sectors, even though their share in domestic production increased. 
These conclusions do not contradict the evidence of premature deindustrialization 
in Brazil, especially from the mid-2000s on. In fact, it is widely recognized that 
there has been a sharp reallocation of resources from the manufacturing sector to 
segments of low productivity in the tertiary sector in Brazil since the mid-2000s.54
52 The increase in labor-intensive imports was strongly influenced by the rise in textiles, clothing, 
shoes and some chemical goods, while the transport equipment imports (cars, trucks and ships) 
were the main reason for the share of scale-intensive goods to increase. 
53 See Bacha and Fishlow (2011), Bacha (2013) and Nassif, Feijó and Araújo (2017).
54 In fact, according to IBGE, the share of the agricultural sector in Brazil’s GDP in real terms (1995 
price) in 2016 was virtually the same as that of 1996 (6%). Yet, while the share of the manufacturing 
sector in total GDP was reduced from 13.8% to 9.8%, the share of the tertiary sector was increased 
from 57% to 60.7% during the same period. See <https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas-novoportal/
economicas/contas-nacionais/9300-contas-nacionais-trimestrais.html?&t=resultados>. Accessed 
on 25 October 2017. See Nassif (2008) for the 1947-2004 period (in current prices).
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All manufacturing sectors experienced a decrease in their share in total exports 
at the beginning of the 1990s, except the science-based group (Table 3). The 
reduction in the share of manufactured goods in total Brazilian exports is, in part, 
explained by the exceptional increase in primary goods exports.55 
Table 3. Composition and evolution of Brazilian exports  























 Composition (% of total exports)
1990-idem 21.1 28.5 12.6 23.0  9.7  4.0   1.0 77.9 100.0
1996-2000 22.4 27.3 10.6 21.1  9.8  7.2   1.6 76.0 100.0
2001-2005 26.4 24.2  9.2 20.4  9.1  8.8   1.8 71.8 100.0
2006-2010 36.8 22.3  6.3 17.2  8.1  7.2   2.2 61.1 100.0
2011-2016 45.1 21.2  4.9 14.5  7.2  5.2   1.9 53.0 100.0
 Average annual growth (p.y.%)
1990-1995  5.4  9.7  7.7  8.2 10.7  5.6  10.3  8.2
1996-2000  5.0  (1.9)  2.3  2.3  1.5 29.2  11.4  3.5
2001-2005 23.4 13.9 10.4 18.5 17.7  7.9  15.2  16.5
2006-2010 21.6 11.3  1.6  1.9  4.7  3.5  11.6  11.2
2011-2016  (2.3)  (1.3)  (0.7)  0.9  (0.1)  (1.7)   (8.4)  (1.4)
 IMPORTS
 Composition (% of total imports)
1990-1995 20.7 22.5  7.6 14.4 18.8 15.9   0.0 79.3 100.0
1996-2000 12.6 20.5  8.7 16.3 21.8 19.9   0.1 87.2 100.0
2001-2005 15.5 18.5  7.8 14.2 21.3 22.6   0.0 84.5 100.0
2006-2010 14.4 19.3  8.4 17.7 19.0 20.1   1.2 84.4 100.0
2011-2016 11.2 21.0  9.7 19.2 18.7 20.2   0.0 88.7 100.0
 Average annual growth (p.y.%)
1990-1995  (1.3) 25.3 33.2 38.2 19.7 19.1  39.0  19.1
1996-2000  (0.6)  (0.9)  (3.7)  (4.9)  2.5  9.0  48.2  0.7
2001-2005 13.1  2.1  5.5  6.5  4.6  5.0  (48.2)  5.7
2006-2010 10.7 22.3 22.9 27.7 19.6 16.2 105.5  19.7
2011-2016  (7.9)  (4.2)  (2.6) (6.8)  (4.7)  (1.6)   (2.8)  (4.5)
Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
Among manufactured goods, labor-intensive goods are the product group 
which has lost the highest share in exports since 1990 (from 13% to 5%), since 
the competitiveness of Brazilian goods in global markets significantly declined. 
Exports of scale-intensive goods also showed a remarkable decrease especially 
due to the reduction of steel products. The exports of science-based goods showed 
55 The accumulated growth rate of Brazilian exports exceeded the rate of world exports for 
manufactured goods for the entire period 1990-2016 due mainly to the good performance 
between 2004 and 2013. Moreover, as shown by Castilho, Costa and Torracca. (2017), the export 
primarization in Brazil has a very strong geographical character since exports to China, which 
became the first trade partner after the financial crisis, are very concentrated in primary and 
resource-based goods.
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quite a dynamic trajectory till 2005, when their share in total exports began to 
retract. In 2016, their share (5.6%) was close to the average of the 1990s. Finally, 
despite the loss of around one quarter of their share in total exports, resource-based 
and specialized suppliers were the only categories which augmented their share 
in manufacturing goods exports. 
The different export performances of the product groups are illustrated with 
annual data in Figure 7. While the reduction in the share of scale-intensive, 
labor-intensive and resource-based goods began in the first half of the 1990s, 
specialized suppliers and science-based goods performed well for a longer time 
during the period 1990-2016. The highest export share of specialized suppliers 
was reached in 1996, and for science-based goods by 2000. 
Figure 7. Brazilian exports composition by product groups 
(1990-2016 – % of total exports)
Primary goods Resource-based Labor-intensive Scale-intensive










































Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database. 
Figure 8 displays the market share of Brazilian exports in total world exports. 
Despite the strong loss of importance of manufactured goods in Brazilian 
exports, their performance in world markets is less dramatic. In fact, the so-called 
primarization process is partially explained by the commodities price boom 
and affected not only Brazil but also world exports. Figure 8 shows that, for 
manufactured goods, Brazil kept its (low) share of 1% in world exports until 2008. 
In terms of world market share, the product groups performed very differently. 
The labor-intensive goods are the only group presenting a net reduction from 
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1990 to 2016—a 25% loss of its world market share. Exports in science-based 
goods increased their share in world exports during the 2000s and decreased from 
2009 on, reaching 0.4% at the end of the period. Scale-intensive goods reached 
their highest share in world markets in 2005, when from this year on their share 
kept floating around 1%. Specialized suppliers’ goods are the group with a more 
stable share during the period—around 0.6% over the 26-year period. Finally, 
resource-based goods, even showing a slightly decreasing tendency between 
1995 and 2014, is the Brazilian manufacturing sector with the highest share in 
the world market. Primary goods presented a completely different performance: 
their market share, after a decade of relative stability of around 1.8% in the 1990s, 
was multiplied by 3.4 by 2016. Brazilian primary goods exports represented in 
that year 6.3% of total world exports.
Figure 8. Market share of Brazilian exports in world exports,  
by product group (1990-2016, % of world exports)
Primary goods Resource-based Labor-intensive Scale-intensive















































Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database. 
A traditional indicator of a country’s pattern of specialization is Balassa’s (1965) 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) [see equation A.1 in Appendix 2], whose 
results are shown in Figure 9.56 Indicators clearly register a deepening of Brazilian 
export specialization based on primary goods. Since it was accompanied by a 
continuous drop of the RCA of several manufactured goods categories (notably, 
56 If RCA is above 1, that means the country has comparative advantage, whereas if RCA is below 1, 
that means absence of comparative advantage—or comparative disadvantage.
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labor-intensive, science-based and specialized suppliers), these results characterize 
a regressive specialization of Brazilian trade. Changes were stronger from 2000 
on than over the 1990s.57 
Figure 9. Brazilian revealed competitive advantage
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Source: Calculated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
For analyzing if, and if so the extent to which, Brazilian trade flows have been 
concentrated or diversified in the last decades, we used the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) as specified in equation A.2 in Appendix 2 and shown in Figure 10. 
As the HHI basically measures the degree of concentration (the larger the HH 
index, the more concentrated are the exports or imports), Figure 10 shows that 
Brazilian imports are currently more diversified than exports. The HHI also puts in 
evidence not only the difference in the concentration degree of trade flows, but also 
the divergent trends in the last ten years. Exports have shown a concentration trend 
after 2004, while imports presented a stable evolution, after their diversification in 
the first half of the 1990s. The maximum level of export concentration measured 
by the HHI was reached in 2011. This latter result reflects the emergence of China 
as one of the most important Brazilian trade partners after the 2008 global crisis. 
In fact, Brazilian exports grew sharply and became extremely concentrated in 
mineral ores, soybeans and oil.58 
57 These trends are also confirmed by Nassif, Feijó and Araújo’s (2015) empirical study.
58 These three products represent around 75% of Brazilian exports to China. As international prices 
of these commodities were very high until 2012, the share of these products in total exports rose 
remarkably. 
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Figure 10. Degree of concentration of Brazilian exports  






























































Source: Calculated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
Table 4 shows the HHI for exports classified by factor content and technological 
sophistication. The major concentration changes occurred with the science-based 
goods, which showed the highest degree of export concentration by 2016. This was 
due to the high share of aircraft exports in this group. 59 The above mentioned “China 
effect” has clearly influenced the high concentration of primary and resource-based 
goods. The group of scale-intensive goods is the one that exhibited the most stable 
degree of export concentration in the whole period. 
Table 4. Concentration of Brazilian exports, by product group (HH Index, 1990-2016)
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016
Primary goods 0.186 0.181 0.156 0.149 0.181 0.149
Resource-based industry 0.094 0.077 0.068 0.072 0.122 0.117
Labor-intensive 0.126 0.107 0.110 0.097 0.099 0.116
Scale-intensive 0.093 0.086 0.089 0.086 0.086 0.084
Specialized suppliers 0.129 0.079 0.087 0.089 0.081 0.086
Science-based 0.190 0.090 0.331 0.223 0.192 0.250
Total 0.025 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.044 0.035
Source: Calculated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
Another way of evaluating the degree of diversification is to measure the 
extent to which Brazil has exported old and established goods in the world 
markets (intensive margin) or new products and other goods with increasing 
59 Since 1990, airplanes have been the most important product in the science-based category. In the 
first half of the 1990s, they accounted for a quarter of this category’s exports and reached 46% 
in 2016. 
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share in world exports (extensive margin). The intensive (IM) and extensive 
(EM) margins were calculated according to the methodology proposed by 
Hummels and Klenow (2005) and are expressed by equations A.3 and A.4, 
presented in Appendix 2.60 The former corresponds to a country’s market share 
of world exports in the products or categories in which it exports, indicating how 
consolidated the country is in exporting the same category of goods in the markets 
it traditionally acts in. The latter corresponds to the share of a country’s export 
basket in old or new goods dynamically demanded by global markets.  Then, 
the EM shows how important the country’s export basket (or its “portfolio”) is 
for the world market.61 
Table 5 shows the IM and EM for both total exports and categories of goods 
classified according to factor content and technological sophistication. Concerning 
total exports, despite the loss of market share in the categories or goods that Brazil 
exports (intensive margin), the portfolio highly demanded by global markets 
(extensive margin) has gained importance in world markets.62 The evolution of 
the EM may, at first sight, seem to contradict the results shown by the HHI index, 
which revealed a concentration trend of exports from 2007 on. Indeed, the EM 
considers the range of the country’s exported goods demanded by the world, and, 
therefore, it is a measure of dynamism or adherence of the country’s export basket 
to the world trade. In fact, Brazil has notably expanded the number of exported 
goods but, in terms of value in US dollar, its exports have become increasingly 
concentrated in primary and other commodity goods.63 This explains why the larger 
increases of the EM occurred for primary and resource-based goods, showing the 
dynamism of these groups in the global markets in the period, while the smaller 
changes took place in the more technologically sophisticated sectors exported 
by Brazil – science-based and specialized suppliers. These different sectoral 
60 There are other different definitions such as the one used by Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola 
(2008) which identifies “old” and “new” import and export products and markets of a country 
by comparing the existence of trade flows with a reference period. 
61 According to Hummels and Klenow (2005), export growth can result from the expansion of exports 
of goods already exported or from a diversification process which corresponds to the “enlargement 
of the variety of exported goods” (p. 3). The second source of growth is usually associated with 
monopolistic competition models based on Krugman (1981), whose main prediction is that big 
countries will produce and export a larger variety of goods. 
62 The number of products is an alternative way of measuring EM – see Carmo and Bittencourt 
(2014), for example. For this period, the number of products, defined at the 6-digit level of the 
1992 HS classification, grew from 3,829 in 1990 to 4,263 in 2000 (out of a total of 5,036 products).
63 To illustrate this point, we compared the EM, the number of exported goods and the share of 
the top 100 exported goods in Brazil, Argentina and the United States for 2016, using Comtrade 
exports data disaggregated at the 6-digit level of 2012 HS classification. The EM is over 90% 
for all these countries (92% for Argentina, 98% for Brazil and 100% for the United States), 
suggesting that these countries have a diversified export basket. The number of exported goods, 
however, is quite different for each, corresponding to 69%, 84% and 99% for Argentina, Brazil 
and the United States, respectively, of the set of around 5,200 goods. But the share of the top 
100 exported goods in their total exports reveals a big difference in the degree of concentration 
in US dollar value terms: in Argentina and Brazil, the top exported goods represent, respectively, 
85% and 78% of the value of their total exports, while in the United States this share is much 
lower – 47%. In other words, even considering that Brazil has a large number of different goods 
in its export basket, in value terms its exports are quite concentrated.
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changes suggest that primary goods revealed a more dynamic performance, since it 
recovered its market share and showed a huge diversification in the global markets 
in the last decades. 
Table 5. The intensive (IM) and extensive margin (EM)  
of Brazilian exports by product groups (1990-2016)
 1990 2000 2010 2016
 EM IM EM IM EM IM EM IM
Primary goods 50.1 11.1 94.4 2.0 97.3 4.5 93.7 6.4
Resource-based industry 77.9 5.2 89.9 1.6 87.6 1.8 96.8 1.7
Labor-intensive 94.2 1.9 98.2 0.7 98.9 0.6 99.3 0.5
Scale-intensive 94.4 1.9 98.1 1.0 98.8 1.1 98.9 1.1
Specialized suppliers 96.0 1.2 99.2 0.5 99.3 0.7 99.6 0.7
Science-based 97.2 0.9 99.2 0.7 98.6 0.5 99.5 0.4
Total 88.2 2.6 96.7 1.0 96.3 1.5 98.2 1.4
Source: Calculated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
As we analyzed in Section 3.2 and as shown by Krugman’s models (1979, 
1980, 1981), the share of intraindustrial trade in total trade is usually larger among 
countries with similar development and income levels. And as this kind of trade 
is driven by scale-intensive and science-based industries, it is more dynamic 
and leads to gains for both partners due to the joint effect of higher competition 
and economies of scale. Depending on the level of statistical data disaggregation, 
intraindustrial trade sheds light on the degree of productive integration between 
countries as well as the extent to which trade partners engage in regional and 
global value chains. 
We measured Brazil’s intraindustrial trade through the Grubel-Lloyd Index 
(GLI), as expressed by equation A.5 in Appendix 2 (GRUBEL-LLOYD, 
1971). As Reis and Farole (2012, p. 35) suggest, GLI is important for not only 
indicating the amount of intraindustrial trade (GLI equal to 1 indicates maximum 
intraindustrial trade), but also for capturing the degree of diversification 
within an industry (GLI equal to zero indicates absence of diversification within 
an industry). 
Table 6 shows GLI for Brazil between 1990 and 2016, which is estimated 
using data disaggregated at the 3-digit level of the Standard International 
Trade Classification (STIC; 240 products) and considers trade with all partners.64 
64 If on one hand, higher levels of product aggregation overestimate intraindustrial trade, on the 
other hand, if one intends to analyze geographical dimensions of this kind of trade (for regional 
integration studies, for example), it would be desirable to consider bilateral trade flows. For more 
details on these issues, see Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997).
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Table 6. Brazilian intraindustry trade by product groups 
(Grubel-Lloyd Index, 1990-2016)
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016
Primary goods 0.168 0.184 0.167 0.094 0.080 0.098
Resource-based industry 0.136 0.217 0.256 0.257 0.199 0.212
Labor-intensive 0.292 0.329 0.293 0.298 0.240 0.243
Scale-intensive 0.231 0.328 0.302 0.268 0.319 0.324
Specialized suppliers 0.450 0.370 0.342 0.470 0.360 0.387
Science-based 0.457 0.534 0.305 0.271 0.397 0.372
Total 0.300 0.383 0.412 0.433 0.401 0.356
Source: Calculated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
The index of intraindustrial trade in the Brazilian trade pattern is quite reduced 
(around 0.36).65 After having grown between 1990 and 2005, the GLI showed 
a continuous reduction. The level and evolution of intraindustrial trade differ 
significantly between groups. As expected, the intraindustrial trade is more 
important for more elaborated goods or capital-intensive categories. As also 
expected, science-based, specialized suppliers and scale-intensive sectors are 
those with higher GLI due to their higher potential capacity to explore gains from 
economies of scale and product differentiation. The GL indices for science-based 
industries indicate that the intraindustrial trade rapidly grew in the middle of the 
1990s, strongly decreased from the end of this decade onwards and vigorously 
recovered after the 2008 global crisis. This recovery reflects larger trade flows 
within Mercosur, especially automobiles and airplanes.66 While scale-intensive 
industries increased their GLI between 1990 and 2016, specialized suppliers 
and labor-intensive showed reductions. As expected, the primary goods and the 
resource-based groups show the smallest values for the GLI in the period.
Table 7 shows the composition of exports and imports according to Brazil’s trade 
partners (1990-2016). Table 7 suggests that Brazil can be classified as a “global 
trader” because of its large variety of trade partners. Over the period 1990-2016, 
there were some important changes in the geographical composition of Brazilian 
trade. First, its most traditional partners [the United States and the European Union 
(EU)]67 lost importance throughout this period. This reduction is stronger on the 
export side of Brazil, while on the import side, the EU kept its share in the Brazilian 
market. Brazil’s export share in Latin American countries increased during the 
1990s, when they became a major destination for Brazilian exports. Mercosur was 
the main market responsible for this change, which is also confirmed by the huge 
65 As several empirical studies show, the index of intraindustrial trade between some developed 
countries used to surpass 0.50. See, for instance, Ito and Okubo (2011).
66 Mercosur is the custom union that joins Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
Intra-Mercosur trade grew rapidly until 1997, with a notable share of intraindustry trade in 
automobiles and capital goods sectors. The intra-regional trade was so negatively affected by 
the 1998-1999 Brazilian crisis and the 1999-2001 Argentinean crisis that it did not return to the 
1990s level. 
67 Here we kept the 12 countries belonging to the EU in 1990 and that remained the main partners 
(more than 90% of EU27 trade). 
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rise of Argentinean share both in exports and imports. After 2000, bilateral trade with 
Argentina declined, affecting Latin America’s total trade. Even after this decline, 
Latin America remained as one of Brazil’s most important partners, especially 
on the export side. Another marked change in Brazilian trade was the increase 
of China’s share in Brazilian trade after 2010. While in 2000, China’s share for 
Brazilian exports and imports was around 2% of Brazil’s total trade, this indicator 
jumped after the 2008 global crisis, reaching 19.2% and 17%, respectively, in 2016.
Table 7. Geographical distribution of Brazilian  
exports and imports (1990-2016; in percentage)
 1990 2000 2010 2016
 EXPORT IMPORT EXPORT IMPORT EXPORT IMPORT EXPORT IMPORT
Latin America  11.0  12.5  24.8  21.7  21.6  15.3  19.5  12.1
Argentina   2.1   6.7  11.5  12.3   9.3   8.0   7.3   6.6
Mexico   1.6   0.9   3.2   1.4   1.9   2.1   2.1   2.6
United States  24.6  20.1  24.7  23.4   9.8  15.1  12.7  17.5
European Union 12  28.3  19.4  26.5  22.9  20.4  18.5  16.8  19.4
China   1.2   0.9   2.0   2.2  15.5  14.1  19.2  17.0
India   0.5   0.1   0.4   0.5   1.8   2.3   1.7   1.8
Japan   7.5   7.2   4.6   5.3   3.6   3.9   2.5   2.6
South Korea   1.7   0.4   1.1   2.6   1.9   4.7   1.6   4.0
Russia n.a. n.a.   0.8   1.0   2.1   1.1   1.3   1.5
World  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database. 
Note: n.a.: not available.
Even though Brazil’s trade with other countries (South Korea, Japan, Russia 
and India, as described in Table 8) is not as expressive as that with China and the 
United States, the data suggests that there was a geographical deconcentration of 
Brazilian exports and, albeit to a lesser extent, of imports. In fact, during the 2000s, 
trade with Asia and Africa grew and diversified, even considering that trade with 
these two regions (except China) remained relatively weak.
The changes in geographical composition of Brazilian exports are reflected in 
the sectoral specialization of the Brazilian export basket. In fact, Brazil’s trade 
structure differs according to the stage of development of its trade partners and 
the specialization of the partners. Bilateral trade can have a kind of North-South 
pattern of specialization, as analyzed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3. That is, Brazil’s trade 
pattern with the European Union and China is different from that with Mercosur 
or other neighboring countries. As shown by Castilho, Costa and Torracca (2017), 
in the last decade, the Brazilian export structure was strongly influenced by trade 
with China, which is very concentrated in mineral and agricultural goods. In a 
simple simulation, they show that the share of manufactured goods in Brazilian 
total exports would be much higher if the China effect was not considered.68
68 As stressed by the authors, in 2013, China was responsible for 19.4% of total Brazilian exports. 
As 72% of the exports directed to China are from two goods: soybean and mineral ore (37% and 
35% of bilateral exports, respectively), only the sale of these two goods to China represented 
13.7% of total Brazilian exports in that year. The share of manufactured goods in a world “without 
China” would go from 62% to 73% in 2013. 
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Such differences are illustrated by Figure 11, which shows the change in 
Brazilian exports over time by partner, where the left axis refers to the value in US 
dollars and the right axis indicates the share of each category exported in total goods 
exported to each region, represented by the black lines. We can clearly distinguish 
two groups of partners. The first group is formed by very important markets for 
Brazilian manufactured goods exports—basically, Latin American countries and the 
United States. In 2016, Argentina and the United States were responsible for 94% 
and 84% of Brazilian total exports, respectively. The second group of partners is 
composed by the European Union (EU-12) and Asian countries. The EU is one of 
Brazil’s main trade partners and accounts for two thirds of total Brazilian exports 
of primary and resource-based manufactured goods. Of the total manufactured 
goods exported to the EU-12, 63% were related to intermediate goods. China’s and 
Japan’s shares for Brazilian manufactured goods exports represented, respectively, 
19% and 33% of the total in 2016. Among manufactured goods exports, there 
are also differences in composition: the importance of more technologically 
sophisticated goods (science-based and specialized suppliers) differs significantly 
between these two groups of partners. While for the Americas (Latin America and 
the United States), such categories varied from 18% (Argentina)69 to 36% (the 
United States) in 2016, for the other group, the share is much smaller (3.5% for 
China, 8% for Japan and 11.4% for the EU).
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Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on Comtrade database.
69 These shares differ especially from the earlier years. In the US case, we observed that the airplane 
exports inflated in the later years’ statistics, and the share of these two categories became weaker 
in the earlier years. For LA, the share of these categories in the earlier years was higher, floating 
around 25%.
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Brazil’s pattern of trade specialization as described above is typical of 
middle-income level countries. In fact, as theoretical models of intraindustrial 
trade and technological gaps predict, trade patterns depend on a country’s 
relative level of development and is highly influenced by the technological gap 
itself. These models suggest that developing countries tend to have a kind of 
“North-South” trade pattern with developed ones and an intraindustrial trade 
pattern of more technologically sophisticated goods with countries of similar 
per capita incomes. Brazil does not escape from this general rule. However, 
Brazilian trade pattern with the United States is quite surprising, since it is not 
characterized by a typically North-South kind, as trade in manufactured goods 
has been important in their bilateral trade in the last few decades.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed the performance and composition of Brazilian trade flows 
in the last 26 years. Since most conventional theoretical models reviewed in this 
study, including the so-called “new new trade” models, take either technology or 
factor endowments as exogenous, they are insufficient to capture some essential 
elements of developing countries’ pattern of specialization. In particular, as these 
countries are characterized by large technological and productivity gaps compared 
with developed countries, descriptive statistics indicators are insufficient to evaluate 
the extent to which unconditional engagement in free trade policies can positively 
or negatively affect their long-term growth. The main contribution of Structuralist-
Neoschumpeterian models is to show that the extent of a country’s technological 
gap affects its pattern of specialization and growth dynamics. Specifically, they 
predict that a country characterized by regressive trade specialization has low 
export diversification as well as income-elasticity of demand for its exports lower 
than income-elasticity of demand for its imports, implying a perverse long-term 
growth dynamics and compromising a virtuous catching up trajectory. 
Empirical evidence on Brazil showed that since the early-2000s the technological 
gaps of the manufacturing sector (including natural resource-based segments) have 
significantly increased. In addition, as the income-elasticity of demand for Brazilian 
exports has become expressively smaller than the income-elasticity of demand for 
Brazilian imports after 1999, in comparison with the period 1980-1998, Brazil’s 
estimated long-term growth rate compatible with its balance of payments equilibrium 
has been much lower than the world growth rate. According to Thirlwall’s Law, 
such performance marks a falling-behind path. 
The analysis of Brazilian trade pattern evidenced its regressive trade 
specialization. Despite the significant increase of Brazilian trade flows, the country’s 
trade pattern did not show a virtuous trajectory between 1990 and 2016, especially 
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with respect to the observed changes in the export structure. While the import 
structure remained relatively stable, with the more technologically sophisticated 
sectors accounting for around 40% of Brazilian imports since the mid-1990s, the 
export structure was marked by a severe primarization process. The export of 
primary goods continued to increase its share in Brazil until 2014, even after the 
reversal of the commodity price boom from 2011 onwards. Among manufactured 
goods exports, labor-intensive and technologically sophisticated ones, such as scale 
and specialized suppliers, were replaced by primary and resource-based ones. The 
share of all resource-based segments (primary and resource-based manufactured 
goods) more than doubled over the last 26 years, reaching 60% of Brazilian total 
exports in 2016. 
This primarization phenomenon was reinforced by a concentration trend of 
Brazilian exports. Although Brazil’s ability to export goods highly demanded by 
global markets (the extensive margin) increased for all categories of goods between 
1990 and 2016, these results did not imply a true diversification trend. Indeed, 
despite Brazil having notably expanded the number of exported goods, its exported 
value in US dollars, however, became highly concentrated in commodity goods 
in the same period. As to the geographical composition of trade flows, although 
Brazil can be considered a global trader because its trade relations are relatively 
diversified in the global economy, its bilateral trade patterns differ considerably 
according to the trade partners in terms of composition, diversification and degree 
of sophistication. While Brazil’s bilateral trade with China, which became the 
most important Brazilian trade partner after the 2008 global crisis, is characterized 
by a typical “North-South” trade pattern, the Brazilian trade pattern with Latin 
American countries is radically different. By being characterized by sectoral 
complementarities and intraindustrial trade, this suggests a major potential for 
generating dynamic gains from trade between Brazil and Latin America.
Since Brazil had a sharp regressive trade specialization in the last decades, 
such a trend has normative implications that go beyond the scope of this study. 
Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that appropriate industrial and trade policies 
finely coordinated with other economic policies (including the macroeconomic 
ones) are necessary for boosting productivity as well as changing this current 
regressive trade pattern into another characterized by diversification of Brazilian 
exports towards technologically sophisticated manufactured goods. This strategy 
could help put Brazil in a successful catching up trajectory. 
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Appendix 1
Classification of Brazilian industries according to factor content and technological 
sophistication (correspondence between STIC revision 2 and Pavitt’s taxonomy)
STIC-Rev 2 Product description Product categories (Pavitt taxonomy) Pavitt’s Codes
001 Live animals chiefly for food Primary goods 110
011 Meat, edible meat offals, fresh, chi Primary goods 110
012 Meat & edible offals, salted, in brin Primary goods 110
014 Meat & edib. offals, prep./pres., fish Primary goods 110
025 Eggs and yolks, fresh, dried or other Primary goods 110
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled o Primary goods 110
041 Wheat (including Spelt) and Meslin, Primary goods 110
042 Rice Primary goods 110
043 Barley, unmilled Primary goods 110
044 Maize (corn), unmilled Primary goods 110
045 Cereals, unmilled (no wheat, rice, ba Primary goods 110
054 Vegetab., fresh, chilled, frozen/pres. Primary goods 110
057 Fruit & nuts (not includ. oil nuts), Primary goods 110
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes Primary goods 110
072 Cocoa Primary goods 110
074 Tea and mate Primary goods 110
075 Spices Primary goods 110
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco ref Primary goods 110
211 Hides and skins (except furskins), Primary goods 110
212 Furskins, raw (includ. astrakhan, cara Primary goods 110
222 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit, whol Primary goods 110
244 Cork, natural, raw & waste (includ. in Primary goods 110
245 Fuel wood (excluding wood waste) an Primary goods 110
246 Pulpwood (including chips and wood Primary goods 110
247 Other wood in the rough or roughly Primary goods 110
261 Silk Primary goods 110
264 Jute & other textile Bast fibers, ne Primary goods 110
265 Vegetable textile fibers and waste Primary goods 110
291 Crude animal materials, n.e.s. Primary goods 110
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. Primary goods 110
273 Stone, sand and gravel Primary goods 120
274 Sulphur and unroasted iron pyrites Primary goods 120
277 Natural abrasives, n.e.s (incl. indus Primary goods 120
278 Other crude minerals Primary goods 120
281 Iron ore and concentrates Primary goods 120
286 Ores and concentrates of uranium an Primary goods 120
287 Ores and concentrates of base metal Primary goods 120
288 Nonferrous base metal waste and sc Primary goods 120
289 Ores & concentrates of precious met Primary goods 120
322 Coal, lignite and peat Primary goods 130
323 Briquettes; coke and semicoke of co Primary goods 130
333 Petrol. oils, crude & c.o.obtain. from Primary goods 130
022 Milk and cream Resource-based industry 211
023 Butter Resource-based industry 211
024 Cheese and curd Resource-based industry 211
(To be continued)
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(Continued)
STIC-Rev 2 Product description Product categories (Pavitt taxonomy) Pavitt’s Codes
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour o Resource-based industry 211
047 Other cereal meals and flours Resource-based industry 211
048 Cereal prepar. & preps. of flour of Resource-based industry 211
056 Vegetab., roots & tubers, prepared/pr Resource-based industry 211
058 Fruit, preserved and fruit preparati Resource-based industry 211
062 Sugar confectionery and other sugar Resource-based industry 211
073 Chocolate & other food preptns. con Resource-based industry 211
081 Feed. stuff for animals (not incl. unm Resource-based industry 211
091 Margarine and shortening Resource-based industry 211
098 Edible products and preparations n. Resource-based industry 211
111 Nonalcoholic beverages, n.e.s. Resource-based industry 211
112 Alcoholic beverages Resource-based industry 211
223 Oils seeds and oleaginous fruit, wh Resource-based industry 211
248 Wood, simply worked, and railway slee Resource-based industry 211
263 Cotton Resource-based industry 211
268 Wool and other animal hair (excludi Resource-based industry 211
411 Animal oils and fats Resource-based industry 211
423 Fixed vegetable oils, soft, crude, ref Resource-based industry 211
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or Resource-based industry 211
431 Animal & vegetable oils and fats, pr Resource-based industry 211
633 Cork manufactures Resource-based industry 211
634 Veneers, plywood, improved or reconst Resource-based industry 211
635 Wood manufactures, n.e.s. Resource-based industry 211
642 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or Resource-based industry 211
035 Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smo Resource-based industry 212
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chil Resource-based industry 212
037 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs, prepa Resource-based industry 212
061 Sugar and honey Resource-based industry 212
122 Tobacco manufactured Resource-based industry 212
232 Natural rubber latex; nat. rubber & Resource-based industry 212
251 Pulp and waste paper Resource-based industry 212
641 Paper and paperboard Resource-based industry 212
266 Synthetic fibers suitable for spinn Resource-based industry 213
267 Other man-made fibers suitabl. for s Resource-based industry 213
511 Hydrocarbons nes. & their halogen. & Resource-based industry 213
513 Carboxylic acids & their anhydrides Resource-based industry 213
514 Nitrogen-function compounds Resource-based industry 213
515 Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic c Resource-based industry 213
516 Other organic chemicals Resource-based industry 213
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides Resource-based industry 213
523 Other inorganic chemicals Resource-based industry 213
524 Radioactive and associated materia Resource-based industry 213
681 Silver, platinum & oth. metals of the Resource-based industry 213
682 Copper Resource-based industry 213
683 Nickel Resource-based industry 213
684 Aluminium Resource-based industry 213
685 Lead Resource-based industry 213
686 Zinc Resource-based industry 213
687 Tin Resource-based industry 213
(To be continued)
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STIC-Rev 2 Product description Product categories (Pavitt taxonomy) Pavitt’s Codes
688 Uranium depleted in u235 & thorium, Resource-based industry 213
689 Miscell. nonferrous base metals emp Resource-based industry 213
971 Gold, nonmonetary Resource-based industry 213
334 Petroleum products, refined Resource-based industry 214
335 Residual petroleum products, nes. & r Resource-based industry 214
341 Gas, natural and manufactured Resource-based industry 214
351 Electric current Resource-based industry 214
269 Old clothing and other old textile Labor-intensive 221
572 Explosives and pyrotechnic products Labor-intensive 221
582 Condensation, polycondensation & pol Labor-intensive 221
583 Polymerization and copolymerization Labor-intensive 221
611 Leather Labor-intensive 221
612 Manufactures of leather/of composit Labor-intensive 221
613 Furskins, tanned/dressed, pieces/cutt Labor-intensive 221
621 Materials of rubber (e.g., pastes, pla Labor-intensive 221
651 Textile yarn Labor-intensive 221
652 Cotton fabrics, woven Labor-intensive 221
653 Fabrics, woven, of manmade fibres Labor-intensive 221
654 Textil. fabrics, woven, oth. than cotto Labor-intensive 221
655 Knitted or crocheted fabrics Labor-intensive 221
656 Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons & oth Labor-intensive 221
657 Special textile fabrics and related Labor-intensive 221
658 Made-up articles, wholly/chiefly of Labor-intensive 221
659 Floor coverings etc. Labor-intensive 221
662 Clay construct. materials & refracto Labor-intensive 221
665 Glassware Labor-intensive 221
666 Pottery Labor-intensive 221
667 Pearls, precious & semiprec. stones, u Labor-intensive 221
696 Cutlery Labor-intensive 221
812 Sanitary, plumbing, heating, lighting Labor-intensive 221
821 Furniture and parts thereof Labor-intensive 221
831 Travel goods, handbags, brief-cases, p Labor-intensive 221
842 Outer garments, men’s, of textile fab Labor-intensive 221
843 Outer garments, women’s, of textile f Labor-intensive 221
844 Under garments of textile fabrics Labor-intensive 221
845 Outer garments and other articles, k Labor-intensive 221
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted Labor-intensive 221
847 Clothing accessories of textile fab Labor-intensive 221
848 Art. of apparel & clothing accessori Labor-intensive 221
851 Footwear Labor-intensive 221
883 Cinematograph film, exposed-develope Labor-intensive 221
892 Printed matter Labor-intensive 221
893 Articles of materials described in Labor-intensive 221
894 Baby carriages, toys, games and sport Labor-intensive 221
895 Office and stationery supplies, n.e. Labor-intensive 221
896 Works of art, collectors pieces & an Labor-intensive 221
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths and other art. Labor-intensive 221
898 Musical instruments, parts and acces Labor-intensive 221
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured ar Labor-intensive 221
961 Coin (other than gold) not being leg Labor-intensive 221
(To be continued)
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STIC-Rev 2 Product description Product categories (Pavitt taxonomy) Pavitt’s Codes
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or st Scale-intensive 222
584 Regenerated cellulose; cellulose nit Scale-intensive 222
585 Other artificial resins and plastic Scale-intensive 222
591 Disinfectants, insecticides, fungicid Scale-intensive 222
592 Starches, inulin & wheat gluten; albu Scale-intensive 222
625 Rubber tyres, tyre cases etc. for whe Scale-intensive 222
628 Articles of rubber, n.e.s. Scale-intensive 222
661 Lime, cement, and fabricated construc Scale-intensive 222
663 Mineral manufactures, n.e.s Scale-intensive 222
664 Glass Scale-intensive 222
671 Pig iron, spiegeleisen, sponge iron, i Scale-intensive 222
672 Ingots and other primary forms, of i Scale-intensive 222
673 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, sha Scale-intensive 222
674 Universals, plates and sheets, of iro Scale-intensive 222
675 Hoop & strip, of iron/steel, hot-roll Scale-intensive 222
676 Rails and railway track constructio Scale-intensive 222
677 Iron/steel wire, wheth/not coated, bu Scale-intensive 222
678 Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron or Scale-intensive 222
679 Iron & steel castings, forgings & st Scale-intensive 222
691 Structures & parts of struc.; iron, s Scale-intensive 222
692 Metal containers for storage and tr Scale-intensive 222
693 Wire products and fencing grills Scale-intensive 222
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts etc. of iron Scale-intensive 222
695 Tools for use in hand or in machine Scale-intensive 222
697 Household equipment of base metal,n Scale-intensive 222
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. Scale-intensive 222
722 Tractors fitted or not with power t Scale-intensive 222
761 Television receivers Scale-intensive 222
762 Radio-broadcast receivers Scale-intensive 222
763 Gramophones, dictating, sound recorde Scale-intensive 222
774 Electric apparatus for medical purp Scale-intensive 222
775 Household type, elect. & nonelectric Scale-intensive 222
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, Scale-intensive 222
781 Passenger motor cars, for transport Scale-intensive 222
782 Motor vehicles for transport of goo Scale-intensive 222
783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s. Scale-intensive 222
784 Parts & accessories of 722--,781--, Scale-intensive 222
785 Motorcycles, motor scooters, invalid Scale-intensive 222
786 Trailers & other vehicles,not motor Scale-intensive 222
793 Ships, boats and floating structures Scale-intensive 222
885 Watches and clocks Scale-intensive 222
233 Synth. rubb. lat.; synth. rubb. & reclai Specialized suppliers 223
711 Steam & other vapour generating boi Specialized suppliers 223
712 Steam & other vapour power units, st Specialized suppliers 223
713 Internal combustion piston engines Specialized suppliers 223
714 Engines & motors, nonelectric Specialized suppliers 223
716 Rotating electric plant and parts Specialized suppliers 223
718 Other power generating machinery an Specialized suppliers 223
721 Agricultural machinery and parts Specialized suppliers 223
723 Civil engineering & contractors pla Specialized suppliers 223
(To be continued)
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STIC-Rev 2 Product description Product categories (Pavitt taxonomy) Pavitt’s Codes
724 Textile & leather machinery and par Specialized suppliers 223
725 Paper & pulp mill mach., mach for ma Specialized suppliers 223
726 Printing & bookbinding mach. and par Specialized suppliers 223
727 Food processing machines and parts Specialized suppliers 223
728 Mach. & equipment specialized for pa Specialized suppliers 223
736 Mach. tools for working metal or met Specialized suppliers 223
737 Metal working machinery and parts Specialized suppliers 223
741 Heating & cooling equipment and par Specialized suppliers 223
742 Pumps for liquids, liq. elevators and Specialized suppliers 223
743 Pumps & compressors, fans & blowers, Specialized suppliers 223
744 Mechanical handling equip. and parts Specialized suppliers 223
745 Other nonelectrical mach. tools, app Specialized suppliers 223
749 Nonelectric parts and accessories Specialized suppliers 223
751 Office machines Specialized suppliers 223
752 Automatic data processing machines Specialized suppliers 223
759 Parts of and accessories suitable f Specialized suppliers 223
771 Electric power machinery and parts Specialized suppliers 223
772 Elect. app. such as switches, relays,f Specialized suppliers 223
773 Equipment for distributing electric Specialized suppliers 223
791 Railway vehicles & associated equip Specialized suppliers 223
271 Fertilizers, crude Science-based 224
512 Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols, & Science-based 224
531 Synth. org. dyestuffs, etc. nat. indigo Science-based 224
532 Dyeing & tanning extracts;synth.tan Science-based 224
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes & related Science-based 224
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical produc Science-based 224
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour Science-based 224
553 Perfumery, cosmetics and toilet prep Science-based 224
554 Soap, cleansing and polishing prepar Science-based 224
562 Fertilizers, manufactured Science-based 224
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e Science-based 224
764 Telecommunications equip and parts Science-based 224
776 Thermionic, cold & photo-cathode val Science-based 224
792 Aircraft & associated equipment and Science-based 224
871 Optical instruments and apparatus Science-based 224
872 Medical instruments and appliances Science-based 224
873 Meters and counters, n.e.s. Science-based 224
874 Measuring, checking, analysing instru Science-based 224
881 Photographic apparatus and equip Science-based 224
882 Photographic & cinematographic supp Science-based 224
884 Optical goods, n.e.s. Science-based 224
911 UN Special Code n.d
931 UN Special Code n.d
941 Animals, live, n.e.s., incl. zoo-anima n.d
951 Armoured fighting vehicles, arms of n.d
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Appendix 2
Trade indicators













Where: XBRi corresponds to Brazilian exports of product i and X
W corresponds 



















Where: Xi corresponds to exports of product i and X corresponds to total exports. 


























Where: j is the sub-set of i goods exported by Brazil (that can be named as 
the country’s relevant export goods); XBRj corresponds to Brazilian exports of the 
sub-set of products j and XW corresponds to total World exports (X Wj is the world 
exports of product j and X Wi is the total world exports). The IM correspond to the 
market share of Brazil for its “relevant goods j”. The EM is the share of j products 
in total world exports. 














Where: Xi and Mi correspond to a country’s exports and imports of product i. 
For avoiding aggregation bias, we employed the 6-digit Harmonized System 
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